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Abstract
We establish a causal role for banking access in the spread of the Industrial Revolution
over the period 1817–1881 by exploiting unique employment data from 10,528 parishes
across England and Wales and a novel instrument. We estimate that a one standard
deviation increase in 1817 finance employment increases annualized industrial employment
growth by 0.93 percentage points. We establish the role of structural transformation as an
underlying growth mechanism and show that banking access: (i) increases the industrial
employment share; (ii) stimulates urbanization; and (iii) fosters inter-industry transition
to high TFP, intermediate and capital-intensive sub-sectors. (JEL: O10, N23, R11.)
Keywords: Banking; Industrial Revolution; structural transformation; regional economic
growth; urbanization.
1. Introduction
Schumpeter (1934) argued that finance causes growth by stimulating the
process of industrialization. Although there is broad evidence that finance
causes growth (Levine, 2005), there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on
the role finance plays in the underlying process of structural transformation.
This paper explores the causal connection from bank access to the rate and
nature of growth in industrial employment in England and Wales over the
period 1817–1881. This period of the Industrial Revolution is characterized by
the maturation of the early superstar sectors (such as textiles) and the shift
toward new, rapidly growing sectors (such as machines and tool making). Our
study affords the opportunity to consider the role of banking both in the overall
growth of industrialization and in the detail of its evolution over time. We
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show that banks accelerated the pace of industrialization by causing structural
transformation to occur across and within sectors, and across and within cities.
The role of finance in the Industrial Revolution has previously been in
question since the financial revolution that began in the 17th century (Neal,
1990) did not appear directly to stimulate industrialization. The capital
required by industry was also dwarfed by that raised by the state for fighting
wars. Gerschenkron (1962) came to the conclusion that banks mattered for
growth only in those countries left behind by industrializing England. If finance
mattered for growth only in particular time periods, or only in particular
countries, then we may rightly doubt the generality of a role for finance.
Our findings robustly support the idea that finance was causally important
in nineteenth century England and Wales. Our estimates of the historical
finance-growth connection are also quantitatively similar to those found in
studies of more recent data, which gives us confidence that finance does indeed
fundamentally matter for structural transformation.
We employ highly detailed sectoral and geographical data. We distinguish
occupational change within 10,528 parishes across England and Wales over
the period 1817–1881. Our unique parish data help us to locate the effect of
banks on the industrial changes that happened outside of London in small areas
within the Midlands and the North of England. Since distance matters even
in integrated capital markets (Guiso et al., 2004), we should thus not look for
a role for banks in London to generate the industrial change in the provinces.
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Using new data on local access to the small but numerous private banks that
existed outside of London in the nineteenth century, we establish a robust and
large causal effect of local financial services on the local growth of industrial
employment.1
Having established the causal role for banking in determining the pace of
industrial employment growth, we are able to isolate the mechanism through
which banking caused growth: structural transformation. Our econometric
framework focuses on three aspects of structural transformation as mechanisms
of growth. First, we establish that access to banking causes the local share of
industrial employment to increase. This finding strengthens the argument made
by Schumpeter (1934) that access to finance encourages entrepreneurship as
driver of a process of structural transformation in addition to causing growth
(King and Levine, 1993).2 Second, we use the geographical detail in our data
to show the spatial dimension of this transformation process. We find that
banks triggered a process of urbanization where the core of cities became
relatively more industrial. This is consistent with Chinitz’s (1961) idea of
entrepreneurship as a driver of urban growth.3 Third, since we can classify
occupations at a highly disaggregated level, we identify the causal effect of
1
By ‘industry’ we mean those sectors classified by Wrigley (2010) as ‘secondary’, i.e., all
typical industrial sectors including construction but not including mining.
2
See Kerr and Nanda (2011) for a review of the literature on entrepreneurship and finance.
3
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banks on the growth of different industrial groups: Banks generate the fastest
employment growth in intermediate sectors, in sectors with the highest TFP,
and in sectors that are the most capital intensive.
Our data cover 10,528 parishes in England and Wales outside London over
the period 1817-1881 (Shaw-Taylor et al., 2010).4 The dataset holds information
on employment in banking which gives us the unique opportunity to analyze
the effect of access to finance on industrial employment growth at a high
spatial resolution (the average radius of a parish is only 2.1km). To cross-
validate the banking employment information, we additionally create a panel
of locations and characteristics of ‘country banks’ (private banks outside of
London) from Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000). As we discuss below, country
banks represented the only provincial financial institutions because our initial
period, 1817, predates the legalisation of joint stock banking in 1826. Since
they were private partnerships and often limited to six partners, the country
banks also rarely had a branch network and were of a generally similar size (cf.
Beck et al., 2013). These characteristics mean we can directly measure access
to financial services, helping us recover a robust role of ‘traditional’ banking
activities.
See, e.g., Glaeser et al. (2015) for recent empirical evidence on this relationship. Rosenthal
and Strange (2010) review the literature.
4
We omit the 157 parishes in London because it was dominated by the Bank of England
and since its financial institutions were quite distinct from the country banks in our sample.
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One major concern is that 1817 access to banking is not exogenous. Even
though our initial observation predates the major takeoff in aggregate per
capita growth which occurred after the first quarter of the nineteenth century
(Crafts, 1994), it may be that forward-looking bankers chose emerging areas
in advance of their growth being realized. In that case, we would overestimate
the effect of banking on future economic development. However, if bankers
were correctly anticipating the imminent growth but systematically chose the
wrong locations, we would expect a downward bias. To overcome any selection
bias, and to identify a causal effect of finance access on regional economic
growth, we suggest an instrumental variable strategy that employs the location
of Elizabethan (16th century) post towns. These post towns were located
along six straight routes out of London that the Crown developed at the end
of the 16th century for strategic and military communication purposes. To
speed up such communication, horses were changed at posts in towns spaced
at regular intervals. Depending on terrain, the distance between post towns
ranges between 20-24km.5 These exogenously determined changing places are
the 69 Elizabethan post towns that we use as binary instruments. Post towns
turned out to be the preferred locations for country banks who benefited from
being able to transport gold specie along the relatively secure connections to
5
The American Pony Express changed horses at the same intervals–on average every 24km
(Frajola et al., 2005).
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London. Our first stage suggests that Elizabethan post town locations were
33% more likely to host bankers in 1817. At the same time, checks on the
instrument validity clearly reject the possibility that Elizabethan post towns
benefited (relative to other towns) from having better access to the overall road
network which may have facilitated the flow of goods and innovative ideas. It
is also clear that post roads did not have a direct effect on growth since canals
and, later, railways carried much of the heavy industrial traffic that mattered
for growth during the early nineteenth century.6
Our IV regressions suggest that the presence of a bank significantly
accelerated industrialization. We estimate an industry-banking employment
elasticity of 1.266. Put differently, a one standard deviation change in the
log of finance employment causes annualised growth to be 0.93 percentage
points higher. Our estimated effect points to the mechanism by which
banking operates and the coefficient is consistent with the literature that uses
contemporary cross-country data. The effect of banking is most pronounced in
intermediate industrial sectors which suggests banks played a crucial role in
the wider economy. Distance decay estimates further show that the impact of
a bank on industrial employment growth is limited to less than 10km. Within
6
Consider Bagwell (1974, p.60): “road haulage remained so expensive that a majority of
the goods were despatched by water carriage until, by the early 1850s, the combination of
an adequate basic railway network with a rational classification of goods by the Railway
Clearing House, gave an increasing advantage to land carriage.”
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this range, we also find evidence that having a bank causes urban change: The
presence of a bank means that industry becomes concentrated in proximity to
the bank while the the share of agricultural employment decreases.
Our findings are robust to a variety of checks. We consider variations of
our measure of finance access using a new data set on the locations of country
banks to cross-validate our main variable of interest. We further show balancing
tests for the instrument, discuss possibly confounding effects of first nature
geography (including distance to the next port, flexible latitude-longitude
controls, and terrain controls) and second nature geography (including controls
for market access, wealth and education provision), show that the instrument
does not apply in falsification tests, and present variations of our standard
errors. Reassuringly, all these tests do not affect our findings. We simulate how
sensitive our results are to a violation of the exclusion restriction (Conley et al.,
2012). We find that our estimated effects are qualitatively robust to substantial
violations of the exclusion restriction. Our most conservative results suggest
that, as long as one is willing to rule out direct effects from being a post
town that exceed a semi-elasticity of 0.1, one would still conclude that there
is a causal effect of banking access on manufacturing growth. To put this into
perspective, a semi-elasticity of 0.1 implies 11% higher growth over the period
of 64 years. This is around the same size as the estimated effect of being located
on a coal field.
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We contribute to different strands of literature. First, we add to our
understanding of what caused the Industrial Revolution. Two recent major
contributions are Allen (2009) and Mokyr (2009) (see the survey in Crafts,
2010). Allen (2009) argues that high wages relative to the cost of energy
and capital drove the invention of labour-saving technologies. Some inventors
needed ‘venture capital’, and Brunt (2006) characterizes country banks as
providing this. Our contribution is to show that an absence of such banks,
by affecting the price of capital, could have fundamentally stood in the way
of the technological change driven by the larger forces described in Allen
(2009). Mokyr (2009) views the Scientific Revolution as key to both improving
institutional quality and stimulating the intensity of technological progress
necessary for unlocking modern growth. Financial innovations “were another
manifestation of the belief in progress” (ibid., p. 220) but, for Mokyr, it is not
clear whether they were essential to growth. Our paper finds that the country
banks were indeed a fundamental part of the modernization that took place. In
finding this, we also update the role normally played by banking in textbook
histories of the period. Quinn (2004) and Murphy (2014), hold that financial
development was incidental to the Industrial Revolution.7 This established view
results partly from the fact that the financial revolution occurred in London
7
Exceptions are the case studies by Hicks (1969), Hudson (1986) and Cottrell (1980)
that point to more direct growth-generating mechanisms of finance during the Industrial
Revolution.
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and at a much earlier time (see Neal, 1990) and partly from the existence of
regulations (the Usury Act of 1660, the Bubble Act of 1720) that constrained
private banking (see Harris, 2000) and from the crowding-out effect caused by
war finance (Barro, 1987; Temin and Voth, 2013 and Antipa and Chamley,
2016). We go beyond London and look instead at the numerous, small private
banks outside of London. Doing so, we find a robust and large causal effect of
financial services on growth. There was indeed a connection from finance to
industrial growth, one that was highly localized and not London-based.
The finding that access to finance matters for industrial growth strengthens
existing research on finance and growth in three ways.8 First, our results
support the mechanism put forward by Schumpeter (1934). We find that the
effect of a bank on growth was spatially concentrated and show that new,
innovating industrial sectors which produced intermediate goods benefitted
most. Second, the effect in the past is quantitatively similar to findings for
more recent periods. This suggests that the effect of finance does not vary
substantially across countries and over time. As such, we believe our findings
can inform our understanding of the role played by access to finance in countries
8
Studies previously conducted analyses at the country level (Rajan and Zingales, 1998;
Levine et al., 2000; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Rousseau and Sylla, 2004) or used
comparatively large regions within-countries (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Guiso et al..
2004; Pascali, forthcoming). A comprehensive survey of the extensive literature on finance
and growth can be found in Levine (2005) and Beck (2008). See also Townsend (2011) for
a structural approach to policy evaluation in the context of finance in Thailand.
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that have yet to fully industrialize. In particular, we are able to show how
the importance of local finance found in micro-studies may connect to the
macroeconomic consequence in terms of higher growth (for a recent survey on
access to finance, see Karlan and Morduch, 2009). Third, our work expands on
the literature that finds proximity to banking services matters (Petersen and
Rajan, 2002; Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006).
Our work also contributes to the literature on structural transformation
(Herrendorf et al., 2013) since we show that financial services cause an increase
in the share of industry employment. There have been few empirical results on
the fundamental determinants of structural transformation; this paper is the
first to highlight a causal role for access to banking at the local level. This relates
to the existence of financial frictions that cause misallocation across sectors
(Midrigan and Xu, 2014) and also how that misallocation impacts economic
growth (Jovanovic, 2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief history of country banks. In Section 3 we present our estimation strategy
and discuss the two instrumental variables. The main results are presented
in Section 4 and we assess the robustness of our findings and the validity of
our instruments in Section 5. Section 6 exploits the geographic dimension of
our data to see whether banking access in one parish affects its neighbours. In
Section 7 we explore the role of banks in transformation of the economy both
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across space and within the industrial sector. Finally, Section 8 offers some
concluding remarks.
2. A Brief History of Country Banks
The present prosperous condition of this country is to a certain extent the
offspring of the Country Bank system: it calls into being and supports many,
who but for the timely aid and fostering hand of Bankers would never have risen
above the dull level of the mass; character, industry and intelligence are but
the raw material, like ore in the mine, rich and valuable, but unavailing and
unavailable, except turned to account by the timely application of capital...
Sketch of a Country Bank Practice (1840)
At the turn of the nineteenth century, there were three principal forms of
formal banking institution in England and Wales: The Bank of England; private
banks in London; and, privately owned banks outside of London – the ‘country
banks’. Other financial institutions at that time included the small number of
savings banks and the nascent discount market in London (see Cameron, 1967).
Financial services were also provided by non-specialized financial intermediaries
such as attorneys (on which see Hudson, 1986). Successful merchants and
aristocrats were also in positions to be important sources of capital. Often these
informal financiers became the partners in the first country banks (Dawes and
Ward-Perkins, 2000).
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Country banks were limited to six partners and, given their limited size,
they were predominantly unit banks that served their local area.9 Pressnell
(1956) puts their average capitalization at £10,000 at the turn of the nineteenth
century. The number of current account holders at a typical country bank would
have been in the few hundreds. We can estimate the number of workers at a
country bank using Pressnell, which contains a number of country bank balance
sheets and profit and loss statements. This includes information on the salaries
paid by two country banks which are on average £212 per year over the period
1826–1844. Given the Clark (2010) estimates for non-farm male wages over this
period of £44 per year, this means a typical country bank employed around
4.8 workers. It is likely that this is an under-estimate, however, as it does
not account for the allowances paid to the managing partner and advances
to partners and family, all of which would have included remuneration for
additional employment.10
9
At 1798, 93% of banks had only one office; the average number of partners was around
three and the number of bank customers was typically in the hundreds (Pressnell, 1956).
10
We can compare the implied total number of bank workers to our employment data. At
1817, there are 522 country banks in our sample with an average number of 3.5 partners.
Salaried staff plus partners thus make 4,333 bankers which compares favourably with our
employment measure of 5,592 total workers in finance. Some workers in finance would have
been on their own account (such as attorneys identifying as finance workers), or would have
worked as agents to banks, so a slight discrepancy is to be expected.
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The total number of country banks increased from only dozens in 1750
to around 700 in the 1820s (Cameron, 1967). Figure 1 depicts the number of
country banks over the period 1750–1850. The Figure also reports the number
of banks in existence that eventually merged or failed. The acceleration in
the number of country banks in the early 19th century resulted partly from
the increased private savings borne out of massively increased war debt (see
Barro, 1987; Antipa and Chamley, 2016). This was an emerging sector – as
Ashby (1934, pp.49–50) describes it was “a period of tentative experiment;
of trial and error”. Those early country banks slowly learned the trade of
professional banking, with, for example, Martin’s Bank writing down the
influential pamphlet on ‘Proper Considerations for Persons Concerned in the
Banking Business’ in 1746. Many such country banks emerged as principally
agricultural concerns, while others provided financial services to emerging
textile and mining areas. The early geographical spread of country banks
reflected their partially non-industrial roots: At 1800, the industrial counties
of the North West of England had among the lowest number of country banks
per head (see Cameron, 1967).
The founders of the first country banks were drawn from a wide range of the
populace, from landowners to merchants to agriculturalists and traders (Dawes
and Ward-Perkins, 2000). Their clientèle was also drawn from a cross-section
of the local public: Farmers and industrialists but also spinsters and labourers.
One consistent feature of the early country banks is that they were often
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extremely long-lived and put down deep, local roots with banks subsequently
run by generations of the same family. In 1658 the son of a farmer, Thomas
Smith, opened in Nottingham the first private bank outside of London. This
bank was run by as many as five generations of the Smith family. Between
1658 and its eventual merger into a joint stock bank in 1902 it operated
only 11 branches, of which 10 remained open in 1902. The Doncaster Bank,
when purchased in 1865, still had partners that were members of the family
that established it 1756. Joseph Pease set up a bank in Hull in 1754 and his
descendants were still partners at 1893. Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000) charts
many more of the persistent family histories from the early country banks.
As to the financial services provided by country banks, one of the most
important was holding a license to issue notes, since the notes printed by the
Bank of England did not circulate far beyond London (Pressnell cites a limit
of about 30 miles in the early nineteenth century). Through the issue of notes,
and the discounting of bills, a country bank was thus key to the circulation of
money in the provinces. Of course, a note-issuing country bank needed to back
its liabilities with sufficient supplies of gold specie. That meant,
[T]here was hurrying to and fro; the hasty journey of partners... to London for
supplies of the precious metal, and the hazardous return trip in the post-chaise...
and the constant risk of accident or highwaymen.
Ashby (1934, p.53)
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As we will see below, country banks were thus drawn to the relative security
afforded by using the State-managed postal network. Country banks did not
locate at post towns for the transport or communication benefit that these
roads afforded, as these could be obtained much more widely. It was instead
the security of passage to London that led specifically the financial sector to
locate in a post town.
Country banks were also engaged in activities beyond note-issue that may
be considered ‘traditional banking’: The provision of short- and long-term
credit; overdrafts; mortgages; remittance facilities (particularly to London); the
safekeeping of agricultural surpluses; the provision of legal services. As Pressnell
(1956, p.265) writes, country bankers were most active in “the mobilization of
funds for local investment”. The funding of these activities came from providing
deposit services, the resources of the bank partners and the London money
markets.
Banks that emerged during the boom of country banking in early 19th
century tended to be more speculative and failed in shorter order. Ashby
(1934, p.48) writes that “many of these had been started by tradesmen on
a very insecure foundation.” Cash-ratios, for example, varied widely (Pressnell,
1956) making them highly susceptible to crisis. The legalization of joint-stock
banking in 1826 was a response to these failures and created a somewhat more
stable financial system. Up until 1826, the Bank of England held the legal
monopoly on joint stock banking in England and Wales, a regulation that
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persisted in the wake of the South Sea Bubble (cf. Temin and Voth, 2013).
Despite that, as Cottrell (1980, p.16) notes, “The new joint stock banks were
generally hardly distinguishable from the private country banks in terms of
resources, management and branch networks.”
3. Estimation Strategy
The focus of this paper is on whether access to banks affects growth via the
structural transformation of the economy. In an online appendix, we introduce a
simple model that connects financial frictions to structural transformation and
growth. The implications of this model are much like the already-established
theoretical literature on the connection between financial development and
growth11 except that in our model we make explicit the role that finance
plays in stimulating the shift of labour to industry. In particular, we show
that better access to financial services (or a lower cost of obtaining finance)
increases investment in fast-growing manufacturing and, because of non-
homothetic preferences, growing consumption baskets shift toward relatively
more manufactured goods. Along the transitional path to a high level of
balanced growth, the economy is characterised by a structural transformation
that is accelerated by access to financial services. This theoretical connection
11
The classic contributions include Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), King and Levine
(1993b), Bose and Cothren (1996), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion et al. (2005).
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from the level of financial services to the change in manufacturing employment
motivates our baseline regression model.
3.1. Baseline Estimation
Here, we first consider the following general relationship between finance and
manufacturing employment growth,
γMp = α+ β1FINp +X
′
pβ2 + µd + εp (1)
where FINp is access to banks in parish p in 1817, γ
M
p = lnEmplp,1881 −
lnEmplp,1817 is the growth of manufacturing labour and where the coefficient
β1 is to be estimated. Second, in Section 7, we explore structural transformation
in additional ways. In particular, we consider the change in the share of
manufacturing employment, the nature of spatial spillovers and the impact
on different manufacturing subsectors.
Xp,1817 is a matrix of control variables. Specifically, we include the log of
initial industrial employment to account for possible catch-up; the employment
share in agriculture and mining as well log total employment and log area, the
female population share and the Herfindahl index of industry concentration
of each parish. Moreover, we consider an indicator for whether a parish
is located on a coal field,12 and a vector of transportation infrastructure
controls, including parish p’s access to the turnpike road and waterway network
12
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(measured as network km per km2 in 1817), the change in railway km per km2
between 1817-1881, and the employment share in goods transportation. Finally,
µd is a fixed effect at the level of the registration district, d. In the context of
our first difference estimation, these fixed effects pick up trends on the level of
570 registration districts; on average, a registration district nests 26 parishes.13
The major concern with this specification is that finance is not assigned
to parishes at random. Instead, we expect the provision of financial services
to be at least in part determined by expected future demand. To the extent
that expectations refer to future prosperity in the industrial sector, εp would
be correlated with FINp,1817 thus leading to reverse causation. Related to
this, omitted variables may be correlated with the initial level of finance and
cause subsequent industrial employment growth. A final concern is classical
measurement error. Since we measure financial employment at 1817, it may be
the case that some parishes where we observe finance employment may have
just established these services while other parishes established services just
after. This would result in an incorrect measure of initial access to finance.
This coal information is provided by the UK Coal Authority. It has been derived from
information on abandoned coal mine plans and other coal mining related records and
information held by the Coal Authority.
13
Registration districts were early local government units between parishes and counties
where the civil registration of births, marriages, and deaths took place. Clearly they will
be of different geographical size since there will be some balancing out of population per
district.
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To overcome these endogeneity problems, we exploit exogenous variation
from our instrumental variable, zp, and estimate the following system of
equations:
γMp = β0 + β1F̂ INp,1817 +X
′
p,1817β2 + µd + εp (2)
FINp,1817 = α0 + α1zp +X
′
p,1817α2 + µd + νp (3)
For the system to be identified, the instrument zp has to be sufficiently strong
(α1 6= 0) and must not violate the exclusion restriction (cov(zp, εp) = 0). In
the following, we will introduce our instrument and discuss its relevance and
validity. The instrument exploits an historic incident that created location
factors favourable for country banks.
3.2. Elizabethan Post Towns as Instrument
Our instrument builds on the insight that out of 150 towns that had a country
bank in 1791 (see Figure 2), 130 were a post town (Dawes and Ward-Perkins,
2000). Post towns were attractive locations for banks because they facilitated
communication with London and because the roads were guarded and thus
safe to transport gold and money between the financial market in London
and local country banks. The network of post towns spanned a total of 395
post towns towards the end of the 18th century (Robertson, 1961) and it was
likely selective and established for economic reasons. However, the origin of this
Heblich & Trew Banking and Industrialization 21
post town network goes back to the six ‘Great Roads’ of the Elizabethan post
network (Robinson, 1948) which was laid for State purposes. As we will discuss
now, this provides an exogenous source of variation.
In the wake of the Hundred Years’ War, and given ongoing conflicts both
within and outwith the British Isles, there was, in the sixteenth century, a
growing need to improve and control information flows. The suspicion accorded
to privately organised means of correspondence and the growing demand for
secure state communication across the realm led Henry VIII to choose Henry
Tuke in 1514 to be the first Master of the Posts. Tuke projected the first
formal postal network in England and Wales. A post road was a route along
which State correspondence could be sent securely and rapidly on horseback
(Brayshay, 2014). The changing of horses took place in post towns that were
ordered along these post roads. By the time of Elizabeth I, the post network
had developed to connect 85 post towns to London, as depicted in Figure 2.
There are two useful characteristics of the organization of this early postal
network: First, the roads were laid principally for State purposes; and, second,
the post towns along those roads were spaced according to the need to change
horses. Put differently, the location of post towns was not determined by
economic considerations which raises confidence that the exclusion restriction
holds. As Tuke explained in 1535, “wheresoever the King [is] there be ever posts
laid from London to his Grace” (quoted in Brayshay, 2014; p.273). It was not
until 1635 that Thomas Witherings, ‘Postmaster-General for Foreign Parts’ to
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Charles I, looked to exploit the economic potential of a postal network open to
private letters. Nonetheless, the importance of the post network in the defence
of the realm persisted into the seventeenth century. Witherings motivated the
scheme of inland posts thus,
Any fight at sea; any distress of His Majesty’s ships (which God forbid); any
wrong offered by any other nation to any of the coasts of England, or any of His
Majesty’s forts – the posts being punctually paid, the news will come ‘sooner
than thought’.
Thomas Witherings, quoted in Hyde (1894), pp.73–4.
In line with these goals, we can see in Figure 2 clear State motivations for the
Elizabethan postal network. A road North permitted communication with and
monitoring of Scotland at a time around the execution of Mary Stuart and
the prospective succession to the English throne of James VI of Scotland. Two
roads to the West allowed for communication with Wales and Ireland during
the periods of Plantation that sought to Anglicise the island of Ireland. In the
South West, we see a route to Cornwall that also facilitated communication
with Ireland. Finally, we see to the South East another road to Dover where
information from and about continental Europe, especially France, arrived.
While the start and end points of the six Great Roads where strategically
determined, the post towns along those roads arose from the necessity to change
horses. Fresh horses were kept in intervals of 10-15 miles along the road to speed
up the Crown’s dispatches. As a result, we see post towns lined up as string
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of pearls and a distribution of distances (see Figure 3) between the post towns
shows a peak at around 24km (about 15 miles).14 Variation in distances results
from terrain conditions such as hilly or mountainous terrain, marshland, forests
or rivers.15 We choose to limit the set of post towns to observations around the
peak of 24km and exclude cases where the assumption of random allocation may
be violated. The distribution of distances suggests two natural cut-off points:
below 16km and above 32km. This leaves us with 69 out of 85 Elizabethan post
towns shown in Figure 2.16
The identifying assumption is that these post town locations were not
selectively chosen based on unobserved location factors that support future
manufacturing growth. In a first test, Appendix C compares the characteristics
of early post towns with other locations using the Bairoch (1988) data. We
show that the Elizabethan post towns were not generally larger, that their size
14
Frajola et al. (2005) show that stations of the US Pony Express were located in similar
intervals with an average distances of 24km.
15
Note that this variation restrains us from using 24km intervals between London and the
roads’ final destination as instrument to predict banking access. In combination with the
small size of parishes, the predictions’ precision would decrease with distance from London
thus affecting the instrument strength. We show such a specification in Section 5.1 and as
expected, the instrument is substantially weaker but the results are qualitatively the same.
16
In robustness tests, we will also consider dropping all places below the 25th and above
the 75th percentile which would narrow the interval from 19.24-26.85 km including 42 post
towns.
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distribution is statistically indistinguishable from that of non-post towns and
that they did not grow faster over the following period. This finding supports
our argument that Elizabethan post towns were not selectively chosen.
In a second test, we assess more broadly the balance of pre-existing
differences that might have affected the location choice of Elizabethan post
towns. These include geographic characteristics including geographic distance
to ports or waterways to capture differences which may give access to trading
opportunities. In particular, we consider: a dummy that indicates the presence
of a Domesday village within 5km of the parish centroid; distance to 1670
waterways, existing ports and the coast; average slope (in percent); a dummy
that indicates access to coal; average agro-climatically attainable yield (in tons
per hectare) for the four dominant crops according to the 1801 agricultural
census: barley, oats, rye, and wheat;17 and the agricultural land classification
for England and Wales.18 To test the balancedness of these characteristics
across treated and non-treated locations, we regress them on the post town
dummy and condition the regression on registration district fixed effects, a
17
The productivity for different input levels is part of the Global Agro-ecological Zones
(GAEZ) data published by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
spanning the period 1961-1990. To resemble historical growing condition, we assume low
input level rain-fed crops for baseline.
18
Though the classification is for today, it broadly resembles underlying soil conditions that
determine the suitability.
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control for territorial changes and a control for the size of the parish. These
controls are our baseline controls that account for regional heterogeneity and
differences in the parish size which may be the result of territorial changes.
Table 2 shows a clear picture: all post town coefficients are insignificant
and close to zero. This supports our argument that the instrument is quasi-
randomly assigned. As discussed above, we further believe that the instrument
is a relevant predictor for finance access, because country banks were relying
on the guarded roads to transport gold and money to and from the financial
market in London. Appendix Figure H.1 illustrates this nicely. The likelihood
of having access to finance decreases sharply with distance from Elizabethan
post towns. Going one step further, we assess the relative importance of being
close to a post town or a post road. We find clear evidence that post town
locations are the actual attraction force. With this in mind, we will now turn
to the basic estimation results.
4. Results
We analyze the effects of access to finance on industrial employment growth
using the occupational geography data described in Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010)
for the years 1817 and 1881 (more details and descriptive statistics are provided
in Table 1 and online appendix B). These data provide a high spatial resolution
and detailed occupational classification. We observe adult males in up to 539
occupations (such as coal mining, cotton textiles, and so on) classified according
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to the PST (Primary-Secondary-Tertiary) system devised by Wrigley (2010).19
Individuals are nested in 10,504 consistent parishes, made up of an underlying
GIS of historical parishes updated from Kain and Oliver (2001), with an average
radius of just 2.1km and an average employment of 230 adult males. The
parishes are nested in 570 registration districts which themselves make up 54
counties.20
Industrial employment in the PST classification includes manufacturing and
construction. We calculate employment growth in occupation i and parish p
as ∆1881,1817 lnEmplip = lnEmplip,1881 − lnEmplip,1817. Our main variable
of interest is access to finance. It is measured by the number of adult male
employees working in ‘Financial services and professions’.21 The data for 1817
is described in Kitson et al. (2012) which introduces a ‘quasi-census’ from
the occupational information in the baptism records over the period 1813–20
19
There is no source for 1817 female employment. The 1851 census suggests that, after
domestic services, female employment is predominantly in manufacturing (of textiles and
clothing), although Higgs (1987) and Sharpe (1995) detail concerns about the enumeration
of female occupations in that 1851 census. We control for the proportion of the population
that is female in our regressions.
20
Note that these numbers exclude parishes in and around London (nested in five counties)
and 17 registration districts that comprise only one parish and drop out when using district
fixed effects.
21
Since we use the log of finance employment in our empirical model, we calculate
lnFINp,1817 = ln(FINp,1817 + 1).
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(which we refer to as 1817). Data for transport infrastructure are based on the
dynamic GIS provided by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population
and Social Structure. As described above, data on post towns is from Robinson
(1948).
4.1. Basic Results
Table 3 presents our baseline results from regressions where we instrument
access to finance with the Elizabethan post town instrument. We consistently
drop London and the surrounding districts across all estimations to eliminate
potential effects from the developed financial market in London (and also
because our later alternative measure of finance is particular to non-London
areas). All regressions include a control for territorial changes in the parish
between 1817 and 1881, registration district fixed effects and log area. A
registration district is generally made up of a few parishes that comprise a
city or town and a larger number of surrounding semi-rural or rural parishes.
Including a control for area in all regressions thus captures the main within-
registration district variation. Since parishes in the same registration district
may be subject to similar shocks, we cluster our standard errors on the level of
570 registration districts in our baseline specifications. Alternative and more
restrictive specifications will be discussed in our robustness tests in the next
Section and in online appendix D. The outcome variable is the change in the
log of finance employment in parish p.
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Columns 1-6 of Table 3 show IV estimates of the effect of finance on
manufacturing growth. Column 1 presents the most parsimonious specification
with no other control variables than the log of industrial employment at the
beginning of the period in 1817 as suggested by the theoretical derivation of
the estimation equation in Appendix A plus the basic controls for territorial
changes and area. As expected, parishes with an initially large industrial
base experience lower growth over the study period suggesting conditional
convergence. Parish size has a positive effect on subsequent manufacturing
growth which makes sense, since larger parishes would have initially been more
rural. In Column 2, we add registration district fixed effects to absorb spatial
heterogeneity and the estimated coefficient increases by about 20%.
In Column 3, we add control variables that capture differences in the
parishes’ employment structure. Specifically, we control for the share of
agricultural and mining employment and a Herfindahl Index of industry
concentration. As expected, the share of agricultural employment has a negative
effect on manufacturing growth while mining employment and coal access
support growth. The Herfindahl Index does not have additional explanatory
power. Our coefficient of interest, access to finance, decreases by 9% once
we account for the employment composition. In Column 4, we further add
control variables that capture initial differences in the total employment and
the female population share (since we only observe adult male employment).
Total employment increases growth which points to the existence of positive
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agglomeration effects and the female population share has a negative though
insignificant effect which might reflect the fact that females were typically
in declining manufacturing sectors like textiles and clothing. The finance
coefficient is not much affected by these controls. Finally, in Column 5 we
include a comprehensive set of control variables that capture differences in the
contemporary transportation infrastructure. Specifically, we include dummy
variables indicating access to waterways and the turnpike road network, and
the employment share in goods transportation. These controls account for
the possibility that proximity to post roads might imply a transportation
cost advantage. The transport network-specific coefficients are close to zero
while the share of employees in good transportation has a positive growth
effect. Importantly, including these control variables has hardly any effect on
the estimated effect of finance which makes sense since the main mode of
transportation at the beginning of our observation period were waterways and
not (post) roads. In Column 6, we include controls for latitude and longitude
that flexibly capture potentially remaining unobserved geographic differences.22
They have no effect. For a better understanding of potential biases, Column
7 finally shows OLS results of the growth regression including the full set
of control variables from our preferred specification in Column 4. They are
22
It would also make no difference if we included higher order polynomials in latitude and
longitude.
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substantially smaller and we will discuss reasons for this downward bias in the
next subsection.
In all IV specifications, F -statistics of excluded instruments range between
11 and 15 along with Anderson-Rubin p-values well below 0.01. This underlines
the relevance of our instrument. The first stage coefficients vary in a tight
range between 0.33-0.38. Our preferred estimate in Column 6 suggests that
Elizabethan post towns hosted 38 percent ((e0.325 − 1) × 100) more finance
employees. The second stage coefficient of interest suggests a statistically
significant and positive effect of finance on industrial growth across all
specifications. Our preferred estimate in Column 6 gives a coefficient of 1.266,
implying that a 10% increase in 1817 finance increases industrial employment
by 12.66% till 1881. Since the standard deviation of log finance in 1817 is
0.47, a one standard deviation increase in the log of 1817 access to finance
causes a 60% increase in industrial employment over the next 64 years. This
is two thirds of the standard deviation of the parish-level industrial growth
rate during our study period, suggesting that the effect of finance on industrial
growth is large in absolute terms. In terms of annualized growth, a one standard
deviation change in finance employment causes annual growth of manufacturing
employment to be 0.93p.p. higher.
To put this into perspective, we can compare the manufacturing growth
to hypothetical situations with more or less finance access. In Table 4,
we present counterfactuals that vary the intensive as well as the extensive
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margin. We start by asking how much a 10% or 25% increase (reduction) in
finance employment in those parishes that already have finance would affect
growth in manufacturing employment. Relative to the actual situation, these
counterfactuals would imply 2 and 4 percent respectively (0.2 and 1.2) more
(less) manufacturing employment in 1881. In another exercise, we take into
account that the North has better finance access than the South23 and assign
to all parishes with finance access in the North the mean of non-zero finance
employment Southern parishes and vice versa. Doing so has a substantial effect
– we see 12% lower manufacturing employment in 1881, which demonstrates
how important banking was to the North. Finally, we turn to the extensive
margin and consider changes in the overall access to finance. We ask what would
happen if all parishes we allocated the median number of finance employees
observed in finance parishes in 1817. As can be seen, this implies a dramatic
160% increase in 1881 manufacturing employment. The magnitude of this effect
is not surprising given the relative scarcity of finance employment in 1817; the
consequence of giving every parish a bank is significant in terms of the growth
of manufacturing employment.
Remarkably, the coefficient on finance access does not change a lot across
all specifications once we have included our baseline controls suggesting that
23
We split England and Wales at 53◦ North latitude since it runs from roughly 50◦ to 56◦
North.
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the observed relationship between finance access and manufacturing growth is
mostly independent of differences in observed control variables. In the following
robustness checks, we will assess the balancedness of these controls in more
detail.
4.2. Results in the Context of the Literature
Our preferred estimate of the effect of access to finance on industrial growth
(Table G.3, Column 6) is about 6 times larger than the OLS coefficient
of 0.206. Not surprisingly, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests rejects the null that
access to finance in 1817 may be treated as exogenous in all cases. A first
plausible explanation is that the observed downward bias is caused by classical
measurement error. Since we are exploiting data from a quasi-census in
1817, it might be that individual occupations are in random cases incorrectly
recorded or that the time period when we measure access to finance is a noisy
approximation of the “true” stock of finance that determined growth over the
next 64 years.24
Another plausible explanation for this significant difference is a negative
selection effect. For a better understanding of this argument, we can use the
data in Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000) to calculate the number of country
24
It is also worth noting that IV estimates are regularly greater than OLS estimates in most
cross-country finance and growth regressions (see Beck, 2008).
Heblich & Trew Banking and Industrialization 33
banks established over the period 1730-1830 and the average number of years
they survive. From 1800-1812, we can see in Figure 1 a number of years with
sharp increases in the number of country banks. At the same time, we observe
a drop in the average years of survival of these banks. A more detailed analysis
of the country bank data shows that the majority of banks founded during this
boom failed in the following years while established banks persisted.25 This
implies that the initial stock of banks or bankers observed in 1817 overstates
the banking stock that is relevant for manufacturing growth over the next
decades. If new entrants based their location decision on incorrect assumptions
about the future prosperity of a region, this would explain a downward-biased
OLS coefficient since our instruments are targeting established banks. One
explanation why new entrants made the wrong location choice might be related
to the transition from water power to steam power that changed the economic
geography of production (see Crafts and Wolf, 2014).
When comparing our estimates to previous findings in the literature on
finance and growth, we need to keep in mind that we are looking at a continuous
growth rate, measured as log-difference, over a period of 64 years. For an
estimated coefficient of β1 = 1.266, this implies that a 1% increase in 1817
finance leads to 0.02 percentage points higher annualized industrial growth
25
The failure of many country banks in the 1820s led to an institutional change that allowed
more partners and eventually joint stock banks.
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rate over the next 64 years. In terms of standard deviations, we find that a
one standard deviation (0.47) increase in 1817 finance implies an annualized
growth rate that is 0.93 percentage points higher.
Given the historic context of our study, it is remarkable how close this
measure is to Levine and Zervos (1998) who report that a one standard
deviation increase in stock market liquidity or banking development leads to
0.7-0.8 percentage point higher annual growth in income. Levine et al. (2000)
find that a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of private credits to
GDP generates 0.9 percentage point higher growth. We are using labour output
while these studies look at output growth. Under a strictly concave production
function with constant technology we thus possibly over-estimate the impact
on growth. This structural transformation can be associated with increases in
the rate of technological progress, so we may be under-estimating the effect of
banking on growth. We thus consider our estimates to be broadly in line with
the results based on growth in modern periods.
5. Robustness Tests
5.1. Instrument Validity
In Section 3.2 we have shown balancing tests on pre-existing characteristics.
They all support our claim that the instrument is independent of pre-existing
location factors that might have a direct effect on manufacturing growth thus
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violating the exclusion restriction. In this Section, we extend the balancing
tests to the set of initial controls in 1817 that are included in the basic results
presented in Section 4.1.
Tables 5 presents results of regressions of our instrument on the control
variables, conditional on the controls used in our preferred specification. As
it turns out, post town parishes are smaller than the average, have a lower
share or primary sector and mining employment and we see that they faced
more territorial changes. To account for these differences, we use the instrument
conditional on these controls. Otherwise, we do not see significant differences.
To further assess whether non-balancing might bias our growth-estimates,
we perform an omnibus test in the spirit of Satyanath et al. (2017). The test
assesses whether the non-balancing covariates drive the relationship between
the post town instrument and manufacturing growth. We proceed in two steps.
In a first step, we regress all controls on manufacturing growth and obtain the
predicted values. Doing so isolates the variation in manufacturing growth that is
explained by the control variables. In the second step, we regress the predicted
values on the instrument. The intuition is to test whether the variation in
manufacturing growth that is driven by the (unbalanced) control variables
explains the (reduced form) association with the instrument. Reassuringly,
post town status is virtually uncorrelated with predicted manufacturing growth
in specifications with and without the baseline control variables. Comparing
the estimated coefficient to the reduced form coefficient in a regression of
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manufacturing growth on post town status, we find that the instrument’s effect
on predicted manufacturing growth is 20-60 times smaller than its effect on the
unconditioned manufacturing growth, suggesting that the relevant variation
for our estimations is not explained by the non-balancing control variables. We
interpret this as evidence in support of the quasi-random assignment of our
instrumental variable.
Another way to probe the validity of our instrument is to conduct placebo
tests. Table 6, Columns 1-5 present the results. In Column 1, we locate placebo
post towns in the middle of two actual post towns along the six main post
roads. Doing so gives us a negative effect, suggesting that these locations are
7.2% less likely to have banking access. The corresponding growth effect is
negative and insignificant. In a variation of this test, we shift the post roads
15 miles to the south-west (Column 2) or the north-east (Column 3); we can
also consider the locations from both shifts jointly (Column 4). In all cases, the
first stage relationship is insignificant and economically irrelevant. In Column
5, we randomly draw 69 placebo post towns from the group of parishes with
road access that are not in the London area and that are not part of the post
town network. Again, there is no first stage relationship.
In Column 6 of Table 6, we show the result of an alternative specification
of our post town instrument where we calculate 24km intervals along the
Elizabethan post roads between London and their final destination. 24km
is the distance a horse can travel at maximum speed under normal terrain
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conditions. We then use these predicted post towns locations to instrument
finance access in 1817. The first stage suggests that these predicted locations
are 14% more likely to host a bank and the corresponding growth effect is
qualitatively similar to the effect reported in Table 3. However, the second
stage effect is insignificant which is due to a significantly weaker first stage
relationship. This is not surprising since variation in terrain will affect the
distance between post towns that maximized overall travel speed. This reduces
the instrument’s predictive power. It is nevertheless reassuring to see that this
instrument leads to a qualitatively similar though insignificant effect of finance
on growth. This is in stark contrast to the previous falsification tests which are
based on placebo locations where our instruments should not apply. Here we
find no plausible growth effects.
All our instrument robustness tests thus far lead to the same conclusion:
Our instruments work as intended and there is no reason to believe that the
exclusion restriction is violated. However, since we cannot rule out direct
effects with certainty, we turn the tables and explore what would have
happened if the exclusion restriction was violated. Following Conley et al.
(2012), we allow the vector γ = [γPT ] from a hypothetical regression of
manufacturing growth on finance access, our instrument and the full set of
control variables to differ slightly from zero, i.e. γPT ∈ [−δ, δ].26 By relaxing the
26
In particular, ∆1881,1817 lnEmplp = β1FINp,1817 + ZpγPT +X
′
p,1817β2 + µd + εp.
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restriction γPT = 0 we allow for small direct effects of our instrumental variable
on manufacturing growth and parameterize it. Specifically, we consider the
following two scenarios. First, a case where we do not have prior beliefs about
the direction of the bias and, second, a case where we impose a direction of the
bias. In the most conservative case, we define minimum and maximum allowable
violations of the exclusion restriction (Case 1). Alternatively, we assume for the
instrument that γPT is uniformly distributed on the interval [−δ, δ] (Case 2) in
the symmetric case or [0, δ] (Case 3) in the asymmetric case where we assume
a positive bias.
Figure 4 shows the results of this robustness test. Panel A reports results
with no prior information about the bias. The dotted line represents Case 1 and
the dashed line Case 2. Panel B imposes prior information that the instrument
might have a positive direct effect (Case 3). The choice of the asymmetric
scenario is based on the intuition that post towns may provide unobserved
location factors that have a positive effect on manufacturing growth. All Figures
suggest that it takes direct effects of 0.1 and above to accept the null hypothesis
that banking access does not affect manufacturing growth. To put this into
perspective: an effect of 0.1 assumes a direct effect that implies an 11% higher
growth rate over the period of 64 years. In our preferred specification in Table 3
Column 6, this direct effect would be comparable to the estimated growth effect
of being located on a coal field. This implies that it would take implausibly large
violations of the exclusion restrictions to invalidate our findings.
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5.2. Robustness to Changes in the Finance Measure
To contest the validity of our measure for finance employment, we construct
one additional measure of access to finance based on the locations of recorded
country banks. Country banks were partnerships of no more than six partners
that contracted to provide financial services to a local area (see Pressnell,
1956). Surviving information on the activities of such banks is limited, but
Dawes and Ward-Perkins (2000) contains information on the town, year of
establishment, partnership history, ties to London and year of eventual failure
or merger of those country banks for which records exist. We digitize this to
create a dataset of 1,700 country banks in 600 towns over the period 1688–1953.
For the period 1813–20, we observe 736 country banks that were operating in
374 of the parishes (or 3.5% of the total).
Table 7 presents results when we use country banks as alternative measure
for access to finance. We find again a larger IV coefficient which is about four
times the size of the OLS coefficient and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reject the
null that access to finance in 1817 may be treated as exogenous. The effect on
manufacturing growth is a bit larger when using country banks. One plausible
explanation is that records of the existence of country banks suffer from a
survivor bias that is especially pronounced with more influential country banks
or country banks in urban areas. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to see that our
main findings do not change qualitatively when we use a different dataset.
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Since our employee data is historical it may also be subject to outliers. We
thus present in column (3) results where we include only parishes where the
level of finance employment is less than or equal to fifteen people. In column
(4), where we only count finance employment if our data has more than two
employees in a parish. Both treatments of the finance employment variable
yield similar results to the baseline in Table 3.
The country bank dataset does not contain enough early banks to consider
an extensive analysis using periods before our sample. We observe only two
banks founded before 1700, three banks founded before 1710, seven before 1730,
and 22 before 1760. One might expect, however, there to be some predictive
power of these early banks for our employment measure in 1817, as well as a
relationship between these early banks and the nineteenth century growth in
manufacturing employment. We report results in Table 8 where, as in Table
7, we use the log of the number of country banks. We report the coefficient
on banks that existed at decadal intervals from 1750 to 1810 when we run
OLS using the full set of controls from our preferred specification (column 6 in
Table 3). We see some indication of the early banks predicting our preferred
finance measure. The coefficient on country banks grows from 1750 to 1760, but
from 1770 the coefficient declines. We see a similar relationship in the ability
of early banks to predict later employment growth. The strength of the earliest
banks and subsequent weakness of banks in the later period of the eighteenth
century is coincident with an apparent decline in the quality of the banks being
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founded. As described in Section 2, the early period of country banking was
formative for the sector and many banks that emerged after the first successful
new banks were later to fail. This can be seen in Figure 1, where nearly all those
banks established between 1750 and 1760 were eventually to merge, while half
of those established over the period 1780-1790 were eventually to fail.
5.3. Further Robustness Checks
Additional robustness checks where we consider different subsamples, add
further control variables that account for differences in trading opportunities
and measures of market access, or modify the way we cluster our standard
errors. Among these is a control for the distance to major ports (as a proxy for
access to merchants that may provide alternative capital). We provide a detailed
discussion of all results in online appendix Section D. Table 9 summarizes
the results. Since our preferred specifications include registration district fixed
effects (with a registration district covering on average 27 parishes), potentially
biasing effects must come from factors that vary within registration districts,
attract banks and benefit manufacturing growth at the same time. It is
reassuring to see that our results are robust all these additional checks. In
Appendix E we present results when we use an alternative instrument, early
enclosures of land. Since there can be concerns about the exogeneity of this
instrument, we confine the results to the online appendix.
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6. Spatial Spillovers
So far, we have assumed that the effect of finance is localised within a parish.
While the costs of distance in 1817 were significant, we may still underestimate
the effect of finance in our specifications if, for instance, high population
density in the parish with banking access forces industrial firms to expand
to neighboring parishes. Moreover, there is modern evidence on the effect of
distance in banking.27 In this Section, we will exploit the geographic dimension
of our data and test whether banking access available in neighboring parishes
may have a positive effect on manufacturing growth in parish p.
To understand whether access to finance in nearby locations affects
manufacturing growth and how this effect changes with distance, we determine
every parish p’s first and second neighbors (as defined by parish polygons that
share at least one point) and count the number of finance employees among
them.28 In doing so, we assume that effects are additive. Given a parishes’
average radius of 2.1km, the rings of first and second neighbors equate to two
distance bands covering an average range of roughly 2-6 km and 6-10km from
27
See Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Guiso et al. (2004).
28
We do not know up to what distance firms may benefit from better access to finance
but given significantly higher costs of distance at this time, we only consider finance access
in the first or second order neighbors which is roughly half the distance between two post
towns.
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parish p’s centroid.29 Finance employment in parish p and in its first- and
second-order neighbors is instrumented with the post town dummies described
before. Instruments for the first and second neighbor are defined as dummy
that takes the value one if at least one neighbor complies with the instrument.
Details on the construction of the finance measure and instruments for the
neighboring parishes are provided in Appendix F.
The results of our spatial spillover estimations are reported in Figure 5,
Panel A (the corresponding regression Tables can be found in Appendix G Table
G.7 and correspond to the results in Column 3). The estimated coefficients γ0,
γ1 and γ2 are (Figure 5, Panel A) enclosed by the 95% confidence interval.
The estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification
in Table G.3, Column 6 plus dummies that control for the number of neighbors
and a coastal dummy. The latter two sets of controls account for the possibility
that parishes with more neighbors may be more likely to have some finance
access while parishes along the coast have less neighbors. Our results show
less significant and much smaller effects in the first neighbor to a parish with
finance employment. A 10% increase in finance in a neighboring parish increases
29
We prefer using neighbors over a specification using distances between finance location
and all parishes’ centroids because the parishes’ average diameter of roughly 4 km makes it
harder to interpret distance bands of 1-2 km. In unreported specifications we use distance
bands of 2km and find the effect to be restricted to a maximum distance of 4-6km which
would just include the first neighbour.
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manufacturing growth over the next 64 years by 2.2%, compared to a growth
effect of 14.6% in the finance parishes, this is a significant drop. Finance access
in a second neighbor are insignificant and close to zero for the case of finance
employment.
The most natural interpretation of this strong distance decay is an
informational one: The distance between a bank and a parish has a strong
bearing on whether that parish can take advantage of the growth-facilitating
benefits of financial services. As Guiso et al. (2004) found, distance matters;
using this dataset, we are able to demonstrate just how sharply it mattered to
the spread of industrialisation during 19th century England and Wales.
7. Banking and Structural Transformation
We consider three additional ways through which banking may cause structural
transformation. First, since our baseline measure of structural transformation
is the parish-level growth the level of manufacturing employment, it is possible
that this does not reflect a change in parish-level share of manufacturing if
non-manufacturing employment is increased at the same rate. We thus estimate
the model with the change in the share of manufacturing employment as the
dependent variable. Second, we test for the effect of a bank on urban structural
transformation, i.e., an increasing concentration of manufacturing in the center
of a city. Third, we consider the impact of access to finance on different industry
subsectors.
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7.1. Results with shares
To assess how finance access causes structural change, we estimate equation
(A.20) with the full set of controls but use the change in the share of
employment instead of the growth rate as the dependant variable. Table 10
reports results for four major categories of employment: Primary, Mining,
Industry and Transportation. For comparison, we report OLS coefficients as
well. Since we include the same set of control variables across all specifications,
the first stage does not vary. Post towns host on average 38% more banking
employees. The F−statistic is 11.2.
The effect of access to finance is to reduce the share of employment in
a parish’s primary sector and increase the share in the industrial sector.
Specifically, a 10% increase in finance access deceases the primary sector
employment share by 1.35pp. On the flip side, we see in column 6 a 1.99pp
increase in industry employment for a 10% increase in finance access. The
effect on mining is about five times smaller and negative (column 4). That
banks do not appear to matter for the growth of transportation highlights the
importance of fixed costs in that sector (column 8). The country banks we
study here were too small to fund canal and railway projects. Those investing
in infrastructure had to find different sources of finance (see Trew, 2010).
Heblich & Trew Banking and Industrialization 46
7.2. Results on urban transformation
Using the same method as subsection 6, we now assess the spatial dimension of
the structural transformation that was caused by access to banking services. We
report regression results in Figure 5, Panel B-D where we plot the coefficients
on first- and second-order neighbors, enclosed by the 95% confidence interval
(and in Appendix G Table G.7). In line with the parish-level findings, we
observe lower employment share in the primary sectors in proximity to finance
employment and by the second neighbor, the the employment share remains
constant. A 10% increase in finance access within the parish decreases the
primary sector employment share by 1.8pp and 10% more finance access in the
neighboring parish reduces the primary sector employment share by 0.4pp. We
do not observe an effect from finance access in one of the second order neighbor
parishes.
For the share of industrial employment, we find opposite effects which is in
line with the idea that industrialization leads to increasing urbanization with
a rising share of industrial employment being concentrated in proximity to
banking services. We see the strongest increase in the share of manufacturing
employment among the first neighbors and again, we observe no changes in
the employment shares among the second order neighbors. Comparing the
employment shares in primary and industrial employment clearly shows that
the phase of industrialization also implies an increase in tertiary employment
in proximity to the source of banking services.
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While these effects on structural change appear relatively small, the gross
effect of banking on the scale of the industrial sector is a combination of
structural change and increased employment density. In a last step, we look
at the growth of employment density at different distances from the source of
finance. As can be seen in Table G.7 Panel D, results suggest a strong growth of
employment density in close proximity to the source of finance. A 10% increase
in finance access within the parish implies 11.8% higher growth in employment
density over the next 64 years. Among the first neighbors, the effect drops
to 1.4% higher employment growth for 10% more finance access. Again, this
finding suggests that access to finance attracted manufacturing firms which
boosted urbanisation.
7.3. Results on industrial sector transformation
The impact of access to a bank on sectoral growth will be related to the demand
for external finance in that sector (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). The demand
for external finance can depend on the structure of production – if there are
large fixed costs or high capital intensity, then external finance will be more
important. The nature of asymmetric information in a sector can also play a
role. If the sector is new, growing fast, particularly risky or technologically-
dynamic, then specialized financial intermediaries can benefit growth because
they are experts at evaluating investment opportunities (Greenwood and
Jovanovic, 1990). Rajan and Zingales (1998) also show using modern data that,
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regardless of sector, young firms are more dependent on external finance than
mature ones.
To understand how finance access heterogeneously affects industry
subsectors, we calculate regressions with the full specification (Table 3, Column
6) but separately for different groups of industrial subsectors. To make these
groups, we use Horrell et al. (1994) who construct an input output table for
1841 and classify industries by their capital intensity, their estimated TFP and
whether they are intermediate or final goods. We map the industries in Horrell
et al. to the employment categories in our data.
We again use the log of the number of finance employees as our measure
of finance access, but now we consider its impact on the growth of each group
of secondary subsectors. Table 11 reports on the impact of finance on sectors
grouped using Horrell et al. (1994) by their output type (final or intermediate),
their TFP (high or low) and capital intensity (high or low). Appendix Table
G.8 gives the breakdown of sectors into these categories.
Our results on the subsector groupings are consistent with what we know
drives the demand for external finance, which supports the fundamental role
that finance is playing. Compared to industries that produce final goods such
as clothing or food, we see a larger impact of finance in intermediate industries
like metal manufacture, gas and fuel industries. In the light of recent work
on intermediate goods and their multiplier effects (Jones, 2011), this would
suggest that banking played a crucial role in the working of the aggregate
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economy. This may also connect to the concept of ‘contractual intensity’ (cf.
Rauch, 1999; Nunn 2007) since intermediate goods tend to be more complex,
bespoke outputs.
Taken as a group, those sectors with the highest TFP appear to benefit the
most from access to finance. The contribution of financial intermediaries was
to stimulate transition away from mature industries such as textiles towards
those going through the most change, such as potteries, glass and minor
manufactures. Finally, the biggest difference in coefficient appears when we
compare sectors by capital intensity. Those which are most capital intensive,
such as transport vehicles and iron and steel manufacture, appear to be benefit
more from access to finance. The presence of a bank within a parish had
the consequence of structural transformation within the secondary sector,
funding expansion of those technologically-dynamic, capital intensive areas of
industrial activity and away from the maturing ones. This is the Schumpeterian
mechanism of ‘creative destruction’ at work, driven by access to banks.
8. Concluding Remarks
As Schumpeter (1934, p.106) put it, “The essential function of credit ...
consists in enabling the entrepreneur ... to force the economic system into
new channels”. We have presented robust evidence to support the hypothesis
that banks were causally important in the structural transformation that
underpinned the Industrial Revolution in England and Wales. While this
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relationship is well known for recent periods, it is in stark contrast to textbook
histories that believe finance was a corollary to the Industrial Revolution.
We are able to uncover this relationship because we use new data that maps
banking employment across parishes in 19th century England. As a result, we
can go beyond London and focus on small country banks outside of London as
source of finance. Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation change
in the log of finance employment causes annualised growth in locations outside
the London area to be 0.74 percentage points higher. For the whole economy
except London, access to finance at the beginning of our period explains about
half of the overall growth in industry employment over the period 1817-1881.
Our findings are surprisingly similar to contemporary studies reporting
that one standard deviation more finance leads to around 0.9 percentage point
higher annual growth. We interpret the similarity across different development
stages and institutional contexts as first evidence that the effect of finance
on growth is persistent across space and time. We further show that access to
finance initiated a transition process in two dimensions. First, across space with
the core of cities becoming relatively more industrial. Second across industrial
subsectors with employment shifting away from mature industries toward newer
and more specialized intermediate industrial sectors.
While the relationship between finance and growth has attracted a lot
of research, the impact of finance on the intermediate role of sectoral
transformation as an underlying growth mechanism is less documented. We
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consider our paper as first step to address this shortcoming. Our findings
support King and Levine’s (1993b) idea that better access to finance
initiates a process of creative destruction that acts as engine of economic
growth. Unfortunately, our ability to describe the underlying process of
entrepreneurship remains limited due to data constraints. We hope that future
research will be able to fill this remaining gap.
Tables
Table 1. Parish-level descriptive statistics
Mean Std.Dev.
Secondary Sector Employment in c.1817 87.67 372.92
Secondary Sector Employment in c.1881 218.93 1288.68
c.1817-1881 Growth in Secondary Sector Employment 0.16 0.90
Finance Employment in c.1817 across all parishes 0.53 8.42
Finance Employment in c.1817 in parishes with finance employment 4.64 24.46
Number of Country banks across all parishes 0.05 0.35
Number of Country banks in parishes with a country bank 1.48 1.19
Area (in km2) 14.05 17.65
Share Female c.1817 (in %) 48.99 4.04
Employment c.1817 219.84 541.71
Employment share in the primary sector (less mining) in c.1817 (in %) 60.26 21.26
Employment share in mining in c.1817 (in %) 1.34 6.32
Employment share in the secondary sector in c.1817 (in %) 26.66 15.81
Employment share in goods transportation in c.1817 (in %) 1.97 4.92
Herfindahl index for secondary employment concentration 0.36 0.17
Canal access in c.1817 (in %) 21.93 41.38
Road access in c.1820 (in %) 65.18 47.64
Elizabethan post town (in %) 0.65 8.02
Parishes where the area has changed (in %) 32.84 46.96
Parishes per registration district 26.28 14.14
Parishes per county 294.76 170.48
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for our main variables. All variables are means
across 10,504 parishes which excludes registration districts in and around London and singletons.
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Table 2. Balance of Pre-Existing Exogenous Differences
Coefficient SE
1 Domesday village within 5km (dummy) 0.004 (0.022)
2 Log distance to nearest 1670 waterway -0.159 (0.165)
3 Log distance to nearest sea port -0.006 (0.011)
4 Distance to the coast -0.025 (0.063)
5 Average Slope (in percent) -0.020 (0.198)
6 Coal access (dummy) 0.017 (0.025)
7 Yield oats (in t/ha) 0.014 (0.009)
8 Yield rye (in t/ha) 0.016 (0.012)
9 Yield wheat (in t/ha) 0.014 (0.011)
10 Yield barley (in t/ha) 0.014 (0.011)
11 Soil Categories 0.041 (0.052)
Notes: Each row shows the result of a separate regression of the outcome named in the left column
on the Elizabethan post town status. All regressions are conditional on registration district fixed
effects, an indicator for territorial changes and a control for the differences in the size of parishes.
Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level in all specifications. *** significant
at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3. Basic Results with the Elizabethan Post Towns Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Log finance employment c.1817
1.168*** 1.427*** 1.310*** 1.269** 1.266** 1.266** 0.206***
(0.443) (0.494) (0.487) (0.516) (0.518) (0.517) (0.023)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.224*** -0.263*** -0.329*** -0.582*** -0.560*** -0.559*** -0.598***
(0.078) (0.072) (0.058) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036)
Log area (in km2)
0.170*** 0.232*** 0.280*** 0.262*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.214***
(0.048) (0.041) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.024)
Share primary employment c.1817
-0.803*** -1.297*** -1.175*** -1.174*** -1.918***
(0.271) (0.395) (0.398) (0.398) (0.204)
Share mining employment c.1817
0.849*** 0.237 0.343 0.346 -0.193
(0.269) (0.367) (0.371) (0.370) (0.228)
Coal access
0.104* 0.100* 0.101* 0.102* 0.124**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.061 0.174 0.173 0.172 0.463***
(0.186) (0.212) (0.213) (0.213) (0.177)
Log employment c.1817
0.307*** 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.466***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.047)
Female population share c.1817
-0.113 -0.118 -0.118 -0.100
(0.205) (0.205) (0.205) (0.181)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.020 0.020 0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.647** 0.646** 0.673***
(0.281) (0.281) (0.260)
Latitude
-0.033 0.036
(0.235) (0.234)
Longitude
0.065 0.058
(0.144) (0.138)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.378*** 0.356*** 0.333*** 0.326*** 0.325*** 0.325***
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0017 0.0003 0.0006 0.0030 0.0032 0.0032
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 14.70 13.07 11.34 11.23 11.19 11.19
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measured as log employment in finance. Columns (1)-(6) present instrumental variable regressions and Column (7) presents an OLS regression. The
instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the parish is an Elizabethan post town. Column (1) is the most parsimonious
specification without registration fixed effects that only controls for the initial 1817 manufacturing share and size as well as territorial changes in the parish
between c.1817 and 1881. Columns (2)-(5) are conditional on registration district fixed effects and additional sets of control variables are gradually included.
Column (6) presents our preferred outcome. Finally, Column (7) displays the results of an OLS estimation of our preferred specification in Column (6) for
comparison. Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level in all specifications. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the
5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
Heblich & Trew Banking and Industrialization 54
Table 4. Counterfactual exercises
Growth rate % change in
Treatment Coefficient SE manuf. employment
1 10% more finance employment 0.1704 0.7049 1.55
2 10% less finance employment 0.1535 0.6657 -0.15
3 25% more finance employment 0.1916 0.7587 3.73
4 25% less finance employment 0.1440 0.6453 -1.10
5 Switch finance access in North and
South
0.0281 0.5603 -11.92
6 Ubiquitous access to median finance
employment of parishes with finance
1.0837 0.5711 153.10
Notes: Notes: The Table presents a number of counterfactual exercises where we vary the level
of 1817 finance employment. Treatments 1 to 4 vary the number of finance employees in parishes
that already have finance employment. Treatment 5 allocated the mean of non-zero Southern
(Northern) finance employment to those Northern (Southern) parishes that have non-zero finance
employment. Treatment 6 allocates to all parishes the median finance employment of parishes
that have non-zero employment.
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Table 5. Alternative outcomes
Panel A: Balancing Test Coefficient SE
Log number secondary employment c.1817 0.049 (0.063)
Log area (in km2) -0.435** (0.184)
Share primary employment c.1817 -0.041*** (0.014)
Share mining employment c.1817 -0.018*** (0.004)
Access to Coal 0.006 (0.026)
Herfindahl Index c.1817 0.026 (0.020)
Log employment c.1817 0.032 (0.084)
Female population share c.1817 0.001 (0.005)
Road access c.1817 (dummy) -0.082 (0.064)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy) 0.010 (0.050)
Share good transportation c.1817 0.004 (0.006)
Latitude 0.001 (0.005)
Longitude -0.000 (0.007)
Territorial Changes (dummy) 0.164*** (0.054)
Panel B: Ominbus Test
No controls 0.020 (0.068)
Conditional on base controls -0.006 (0.034)
Notes: Panel A presents reduced form estimations of the control variables on our instrument, the
Elizabethan post town dummy and the same controls as those in the basic regressions (Table 3,
column (6)) except the one that is the dependent variable. Each cell shows the coefficient from a
separate regression. Rows refer to different outcome variables. Panel B presents the results of an
Omnibus Test where we regress predicted manufacturing growth on the Elizabethan post town
dummy. This procedure separates the variation in manufacturing growth that is explained by the
control variables. We would like to see that the (potentially unbalanced) control variables do not
drive the estimated effect of post town status on manufacturing growth, i.e. we would like the
coefficient on the instrument to be insignificant. We assess the relationship between predicted
manufacturing growth and the Elizabethan post town dummy unconditionally and conditional on
fixed effects, a size control and a control for territorial changes. *** significant at the 1 percent
level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6. Instrument Validity Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Between True Shifted 15 mi Shifted 15 mi Shifted 15 mi Random draw 24km Intervals
Dep. Variable: log finance employment 1817 Post Towns South-West North-East N-E and S-W Road Location from London
Log finance employment c.1817
-0.303 -2.072 -0.329 -1.090 22.114 0.941
(1.215) (4.904) (3.465) (2.818) (92.127) (0.861)
First Stage:
Placebo Posttown Dummy
-0.076** 0.038 0.030 0.036 0.007 0.141*
(0.038) (0.060) (0.065) (0.045) (0.029) (0.074)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 570
Control Varibales Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.8040 0.4660 0.9160 0.5930 0.1020 0.1510
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 4.064 0.407 0.218 0.649 0.0567 3.632
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of access to finance measures as log employment in finance in 1817 on placebo instruments as specified
in in the column title. All estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 but replace the actual instrument
with a placebo instrument that is specified in the column title. Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. *** significant at the 1
percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7. Variations of the Finance Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV Finance Employment Finance Employment
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment Country Banks Country Banks ≤15 employees ≥2 employees
Log finance employment c.1817
0.393*** 1.712** 1.117** 1.241***
(0.051) (0.731) (0.436) (0.477)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.606*** -0.609*** -0.564*** -0.549***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.040)
Log area (in km2)
0.213*** 0.244*** 0.253*** 0.274***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038)
Share primary employment c.1817
-2.002*** -1.799*** -1.324*** -1.171***
(0.207) (0.223) (0.323) (0.378)
Share mining employment c.1817
-0.252 -0.097 0.151 0.314
(0.228) (0.253) (0.302) (0.360)
Coal access
0.123** 0.106* 0.118* 0.121*
(0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.508*** 0.469*** 0.269 0.140
(0.180) (0.178) (0.188) (0.223)
Log employment c.1817
0.489*** 0.448*** 0.326*** 0.272***
(0.048) (0.055) (0.084) (0.099)
Female population share c.1817
-0.072 0.010 -0.111 -0.094
(0.179) (0.187) (0.202) (0.213)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.015 0.022 0.014 0.021
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.005 0.009 0.004 0.000
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.625** 0.449* 0.636** 0.651**
(0.260) (0.270) (0.284) (0.298)
Latitude
0.050 0.052 -0.017 -0.016
(0.237) (0.239) (0.241) (0.242)
Longitude
0.044 0.002 0.065 0.064
(0.138) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.241*** 0.406*** 0.399***
(0.060) (0.105) (0.113)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,006 9,795
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 548 546
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0032 0.0027 0.0016
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 15.85 14.81 12.47
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measured as the log number of country banks in Columns (1) and (2) and employment in finance in Columns (3) and (4). Column (1) presents an OLS
specification with the log number of country banks as finance measure and Column (2) displays the corresponding IV estimation. In Column (3), we use
finance employment as measure of finance access and restrict it to a maximum of 15 employees and in Column (4) we focus on parishes with at least
two finance employees. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town. All estimations
are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. ***
significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 8. Early Banks
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Dependent variable: 1817 Finance 1817–1881 Secondary
Employment Employment Growth
Log 1750 country banks 1.039** 0.700***
[#10] (0.497) (0.261)
Log 1760 country banks 1.315*** 0.582***
[#17] (0.385) (0.203)
Log 1770 country banks 0.855*** 0.467***
[#38] (0.123) (0.115)
Log 1780 country banks 0.452*** 0.528***
[#98] (0.123) (0.097)
Log 1790 country banks 0.318*** 0.286***
[#275] (0.074) (0.067)
Log 1800 country banks 0.400*** 0.325***
[#405] (0.060) (0.052)
Log 1810 country banks 0.355*** 0.347***
[#687] (0.046) (0.047)
Notes: The Table summarizes results from regressions of the variable named in the column title
on the log number of country banks in existence at the year noted in the row. Under each row
label is the number of country banks observed in existence at that year (which differs slightly
from the number established before these dates, as reported in the text of Section 5.2). For
compactness, each cell is the result of a separate regression, reporting only the coefficient on
log country banks at the date noted in the row. Column 1 reports OLS results when we regress
1817 finance employment on country banks. Column 2 reports OLS results when we regress 1817-
1881 manufacturing employment growth on country banks. All estimations are conditional on the
controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on
the registration district level. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent
level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 9. Additional Robustness Tests
(1) (2)
Specification Coefficient SE
Baseline 1.266** (0.517)
1 Including London 1.281** (0.514)
2 Excluding North 1.480** (0.634)
3 10 km buffer around post roads 1.434** (0.577)
4 Only road parishes 0.882** (0.431)
5 Distance between post towns within p25-p75 1.148** (0.475)
6 Log employment within 15km 1.289** (0.518)
7 Log distance to the next port 1.276** (0.515)
8 Market access, post town 1.263** (0.519)
9 Market access, market town 1.287** (0.539)
10 Soil Suitability 1.267** (0.518)
11 Land Cover 1.327** (0.531)
12 Wealth, measures as share of servants 1.255** (0.520)
13 Education, measured as share of teachers 1.197** (0.477)
14 Innovation, measured as patents 1.381** (0.617)
15 Bartik control for predicted employment growth 1.122** (0.520)
16 Cluster SE by county 1.266** (0.631)
17 Cluster SE by 100km grid 1.266** (0.546)
18 Cluster SE by 50km grid 1.266** (0.510)
Notes: The Table summarizes results from instrumental variable regressions of the log change
in industrial employment between 1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance measured as
log employment in finance. All specifications include the same set of controls as our preferred
specification in Table 3, Column 6 but restrict the sample (rows 1-4), modify the instrument (row
5), add an additional control variable (rows 6-15) or cluster the standard errors on a different
spatial unit (rows 16-18). Each line is the result of a separate regression. The first line repeats the
baseline results from Table 3, Column 6. Full regression results are available in the online appendix.
Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level in rows 1-15 or as specified in rows
16-18. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant
at the 10 percent level.
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Table 10. Results with shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture Mining Industry Transportation
Dependent variable: Change in employment share of: OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Log finance employment c.1817
-0.022*** -0.135** -0.004* -0.049** 0.021*** 0.199** 0.002 -0.031
(0.004) (0.059) (0.002) (0.024) (0.003) (0.087) (0.001) (0.046)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.009 -0.013** 0.003* 0.002 -0.095*** -0.089*** -0.005 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
Log area (in km2)
0.034*** 0.029*** 0.002* 0.000 -0.010*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Share primary employment c.1817
-0.591*** -0.670*** 0.034*** 0.002 0.080* 0.204*** 0.004 -0.019
(0.032) (0.054) (0.011) (0.019) (0.047) (0.070) (0.031) (0.019)
Share mining employment c.1817
-0.125*** -0.182*** -0.402*** -0.425*** 0.219*** 0.310*** -0.034** -0.051***
(0.040) (0.052) (0.040) (0.041) (0.032) (0.057) (0.015) (0.020)
Coal access
-0.045*** -0.043*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.010* 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.043* 0.074** -0.026** -0.013 -0.050 -0.098** -0.047* -0.038**
(0.024) (0.030) (0.010) (0.012) (0.047) (0.046) (0.028) (0.019)
Log employment c.1817
-0.048*** -0.028** -0.001 0.007 0.113*** 0.082*** 0.009 0.014
(0.007) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013)
Female population share c.1817
0.003 0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.018 -0.018
(0.035) (0.037) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
-0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Share good transportation c.1817
-0.227*** -0.225*** -0.021 -0.019 0.301*** 0.296*** -0.703*** -0.703***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.015) (0.038) (0.041) (0.025) (0.025)
Latitude
0.031 0.039 0.019 0.022 0.016 0.004 -0.033** -0.031**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014)
Longitude
-0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008)
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of change in share of the sector noted between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance measured
as log employment in finance. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town. All estimations
are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. ***
significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 11. Results On Subsector Groupings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Final Intermediate TFP Capital intensity
Dep. Variable: ∆ log employment in: goods goods High Low High Low
Log finance employment c.1817
1.254** 1.529** 1.420*** 1.274** 1.544*** 1.201**
(0.513) (0.605) (0.505) (0.538) (0.593) (0.505)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.659*** -0.869*** -0.778*** -0.694*** -0.837*** -0.676***
(0.025) (0.053) (0.030) (0.022) (0.045) (0.023)
Log area (in km2)
0.259*** 0.269*** 0.208*** 0.272*** 0.257*** 0.263***
(0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.040) (0.045) (0.037)
Share primary employment c.1817
-1.485*** -1.294*** -1.200*** -1.511*** -1.359*** -1.517***
(0.378) (0.295) (0.291) (0.377) (0.297) (0.364)
Share mining employment c.1817
-0.368 0.992*** -0.188 0.094 0.770** -0.353
(0.358) (0.383) (0.293) (0.358) (0.368) (0.342)
Coal access
0.009 0.260*** 0.067 0.093 0.212*** 0.023
(0.055) (0.070) (0.050) (0.063) (0.067) (0.056)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.369* 0.135 -0.039 0.337 0.199 0.324
(0.212) (0.211) (0.207) (0.215) (0.207) (0.213)
Log employment c.1817
0.383*** 0.360*** 0.337*** 0.399*** 0.356*** 0.400***
(0.095) (0.061) (0.062) (0.093) (0.062) (0.092)
Female population share c.1817
0.020 -0.012 -0.206 0.056 -0.089 0.033
(0.198) (0.209) (0.211) (0.200) (0.202) (0.198)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.025 0.029 0.011 0.026 0.019 0.029*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.364 0.436 0.499* 0.319 0.721** 0.259
(0.261) (0.323) (0.280) (0.275) (0.307) (0.258)
Latitude
-0.185 0.013 -0.043 -0.166 -0.046 -0.167
(0.214) (0.245) (0.208) (0.228) (0.240) (0.221)
Longitude
0.114 -0.008 0.212* -0.001 -0.074 0.153
(0.126) (0.155) (0.124) (0.138) (0.150) (0.127)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.324*** 0.294*** 0.315*** 0.324*** 0.303*** 0.325***
(0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0038 0.0012 0.0005 0.0050 0.0008 0.0059
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 11.15 9.463 10.79 11.14 9.999 11.17
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in employment in the grouping
noted in the Column title between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance measured as
log employment in finance. Groupings are listed in appendix Table G.8. The instrumental variable
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town. All estimations
are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard
errors are clustered on the registration district level. *** significant at the 1 percent level, **
significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figures
Figure 1. Country Banks, 1750–1850
Notes: The Figure presents own calculations for country banks based on Dawes and Ward-
Perkins (2000). The solid line represents the sum of country banks that were operating in
a given year, including those merged, between 1750-1850. The dashed line represents the
number of banks in existence that eventually failed; the dotted line the number of banks
that eventually merged into another bank.
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Figure 2. Post Towns
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Legend
# Eliz. Post Towns (dropped)
! Eliz. Post Towns (sample)
! Post Towns (1791)
Post Roads
Notes: The map depicts the Elizabethan post towns in the sample (large dots); the
Elizabethan post towns excluded because of their extreme average distances (triangles);
and, the post towns at 1791 (small dots). The lines are the Elizabethan post roads.
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Figure 3. Distances between Elizabethan Post Towns (km)
Notes: The Figure shows the distribution of pairwise distances between post towns. We see
a clear peak around 24km (c.15 miles). The dashed lines denote our omitted post town
distances of less than 16 and greater than 32km.
Heblich & Trew Banking and Industrialization 65
Figure 4. Plausibly Exogenous
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Panel A: 95% CI with Mean-Zero Prior
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δ
Panel B: 95% CI with Positive Prior
Notes: The Figure shows point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals for the effect of 1817
banking access on manufacturing growth over the period 1817-1881. In Panel A, dotted
lines refer to the most conservative specification that only imposed minimum and maximum
allowable violations of the exclusion restriction. The dashed line assumes the same minimum
and maximum allowable violations are uniformly distributed on the interval [−δ, δ]. Panel
B imposes the assumption that the post town instrument has a direct positive effect on
manufacturing growth, i.e. γ ∈ U(0, δ). All estimations are conditional on the controls in
our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on the
registration district level.
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Figure 5. Distance decay of access to finance
Notes: The Figure presents the estimated coefficients γ0 − γ2 (Eq. (F.1)) from four different
IV regression. The outcome variable is the 1817 and 1881 change in log industrial employment
(Panel A); the share of industrial employment (Panel B); the share of primary sector
employment (Panel C); and employment density (Panel D) in parish p. The treatment
variable is the log of finance employees in parish p (FIN0p ), p’s first neighbor (FIN
1
p =∑
p′∈N1p
FINp′), and p’s second neighbor (FIN
2
p =
∑
p′∈N2p
FINp′). All regressions included
the full set of controls specified in Table 3, Column 6. The instrumental variable is
an Elizabethan post town dummy indicating for parish p and its first and second-order
neighbors. Coefficients are enclosed by a 95% confidence band and standard errors are
clustered on the registration district level. The full estimation results underlying this Figure
can be found in Appendix G Table G.7, Panel A.
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Appendix A: A model of structural transformation and endogenous
growth
Levine (2005) classifies the growth-enhancing functions that a financial sector
can provide. Models capturing these functions are generally of only one-
sector where greater financial development increases, for example, the intensity
of research investment and thus generates higher growth. Our empirical
strategy looks to understand the growth of industrial employment so we
need to understand how financial development may interact with structural
transformation.
We model structural transformation within a parish using a simple form of
non-homothetic preferences; as income grows, so consumption demand shifts
toward manufactured goods. Endogenous technological progress is sustained
based on assuming that land is an excludable input to production. Firms
compete for land by bidding up rent offers; the highest rent bid can include
the costs of innovation as in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). Combined
with delayed diffusion and subsequent labour mobility, we can motivate firm
investment in technology as maximising current-period rents without having to
handle either imperfect competition or a fully dynamic problem. We introduce
the mechanisms by which finance may interact with growth based on the
categorisation in Levine (2005). The model is characterised by a transitional
non-balanced growth path with structural transformation and an asymptotic
long-run balanced growth path without structural transformation.
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A.1. Consumers
Agents are infinitely-lived and endowed with one unit of labour supply each
period. They each own a diversified portfolio of all land. There is no storage
good so agents maximise instantaneous utility each period. Workers have
preferences over the consumption of agricultural and manufacturing output
with a Stone-Geary form as in Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poschke (2011),
u
(
cA(t), cM (t)
)
= α ln(cA(t)− γ) + ln(cM (t) + µ) (A.1)
where α > 0 is the weight on agricultural consumption and γ, µ > 0 are Stone-
Geary parameters: γ is a subsistence constraint on consumption of agricultural
goods and µ reflects some endowment of manufactured goods (from, e.g., home
production). We assume that the subsistence constraint never binds, i.e., output
of agricultural sector is always greater than γ.
Households earn wages from providing labour and rental income from
owning land. There are no costs of transporting output from either sector across
space so we do not index relative prices by location. Labour can move freely
across locations and sectors, so real wages are equal across sector and space.
Below we often drop location index `. The household budget constraint is,
wA(t)lA(t) +wM (t)lM (t) +R(t)/L = p(t)cA(t) + cM (t) (A.2)
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where p(t) is the relative price of agricultural goods, L is total labour supply,
R(t)/L is per-agent rental income and li is share of time endowment spent
working in sector i. The optimality conditions over consumption are,
α
cA(t)− γ
= λ (A.3)
1
cM (t) + µ
= λp(t) (A.4)
where λ is the shadow price of an additional amount of income. Combining
these, we have a relationship between different consumption demands, cM (t) =
p(t)(cA(t)−γ)
α − µ. All output from both sectors is consumed which means that,
on aggregate,
YM (t) =
p(t)(Y A(t)− γ)
α
− µ. (A.5)
A.2. Firms
A parish is composed of a continuum of firms ordered along an interval [0,1].
A firm at location ` in time t produces either agricultural or manufacturing
output (sectors A and M) using labour and land:
Y A(`, t) = ZAF(LA(`, t),NA(`, t)) (A.6)
YM (`, t) = ZM (`, t)G(LM (`, t),NM (`, t)) (A.7)
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where Li(`, t) is labour employed in sector i at (`, t), N i(`, t) is a fixed amount
of land used in sector i, ZM (`, t) is technology in manufacturing and ZA is the
time- and space-invariant agricultural technology.30 For the moment assume
that ZM (`, t) is exogenous and constant across time and space. F(·, ·) and
G(·, ·) are constant-return production functions with the usual concavity and
Inada-type assumptions. We normalise the land used in production so that
N i(`, t) = 1 for all (`, t) and i. If total labour supply is L, the above-mentioned
subsistence constraint means we are assuming ZAF(L, 1) > γ. Finally, let
F (LA(`, t)) ≡ F(LA(`, t), 1) and G(LM (`, t)) ≡ G(LM (`, t), 1).
Total labour is normalised to L = 1 and is supplied inelastically, so
LA = 1 − LM . Since labour can move freely between sectors, wages in each
sector are equal,
wA(t) = p(t)ZAF ′(1− LM (t)) = ZM (t)G′(LM (t)) = wM (t) (A.8)
30
We assume that agricultural productivity is constant across time and space purely
to remove some notation. Structural transformation can be ‘labour pull’ (improvements
in manufacturing productivity push up wages) or ‘labour push’ (where improvements in
agricultural productivity that ‘releases’ labour out of agriculture since its income elasticity
of demand is less than one). The difference can be observed with data on relative prices
(Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poschke, 2011) and for England and Wales in this period, the
evidence favours a labour pull channel, i.e., that manufacturing productivity growth was
driving structural transformation.
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where F ′(·) and G′(·) are partial derivatives wrt labour supply. Relative prices
are thus,
p(t) =
ZM (t)G′(LM (t))
ZAF ′(1− LM (t))
(A.9)
To solve for equilibrium labour choices we can use (A.5) with (A.9) to
obtain,
µ
ZM (t)
=
G′(LM (t))
αF ′(1− LM (t))
(
F (1− LM (t))− γ
ZA
)
−G(LM (t)) (A.10)
Equation (A.10) implicitly defines LM (t) = h(ZM (t)) with h′ > 0: Since the
right hand side is strictly decreasing in LM (t), we see that a higher ZM (t)
leads to a higher optimal LM (t) – structural transformation that results from
improvements in manufacturing technology.31
A.3. Land, technological progress and its finance
So far we have assumed ZM (`, t) to be constant across time and space. Suppose
that the end-of-period productivities in period t − 1 were ZM+ (`, t − 1). Now
31
That the right-hand side is also increasing in ZA shows that agricultural productivity
improvements also lead to greater LM (t) in equilibrium. While Gollin et al. (2002) show that
one can explain structural change during over this period using improvements in agricultural
productivity, the data suggests a steady decline in the relative price of manufacturing over
the period. By equation (A.9), this suggests that the dominant channel is manufacturing
productivity.
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let each firm wake up each period with an initial technology ZM− (t) that
is the average of all previous period’s realised productivities, i.e., ZM− (t) =∫ 1
0 Z
M
+ (`, t− 1)d`. So ‘diffusion’ means that all firms imperfectly observe each
others’ productivities (including their own).
Suppose now that firms can invest in research to potentially obtain a
higher ZM (`, t) at their location. Firms must borrow to finance the research
opportunity at a cost f . Investment in research buys a probability ϕ of taking
an innovation step of ∆ > 0 at a cost ψ(ϕ)ZM with ψ′ > 0 and ψ′′ > 0.32 So
expected manufacturing technology at location ` that invests in research is.
E(ZM (`, t)) = (1 + ϕ∆)ZM− (t). (A.11)
The focus of endogenous growth models after Romer (1990), Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) has been on imperfect
competition since in a perfectly competitive environment without land, prices
equal marginal cost and there is no competive equilibrium in which firms invest
in innovation. However, as shown by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), since
land is non-replicable and excludable, firms that occupy land can momentarily
(up until their technology diffuses) gain from an investment in research.
32
That the cost is proportional to technology is necessary for balanced growth in quality-
ladders-type models. Otherwise continual growth would erode these costs as a proportion
of potential output gains; growth would accelerate over time.
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Moreover, this can form part of a competitive equilibrium because firms bid
for land while taking into account the expected gains from innovation. The
maximum land bid in manufacturing is,
R(`, t) = max
ϕ(`,t),LM (`,t)
(1 + ϕ∆)ZM− (t)F (L
M (`, t))−
wM (t)LM (`, t)− (1 + f)ψ(ϕ)ZM− (t) (A.12)
Labour is hired, land is rented and investment in innovation happens in advance
of productivity realisations. Since all manufacturing firms are identical, either
they all invest or none invest: Then maximising rental bid means that the
optimal choice of labour is now conditional on investment in a probability
of innovation and the analysis above simply follows with E(ZM (t)) instead
of ZM (t). Absent any other frictions, the optimal investment into innovation
satisfies,
∆F (L̂M (`, t)) = (1 + f)ψ′(ϕ), (A.13)
where L̂M (`, t) is optimal choice of labour. Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2014)
show under a similar set-up of labour mobility and productivity diffusion, firms
make decisions to maximise current-period profits only.
Let ϕ∗(f,LM (t)) be the optimal chosen probability of innovation given f ,
average manufacturing labour LM (t). By the strict convexity of ψ, we have
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ϕ∗f
′ < 0 and ϕ∗
LM
′ > 0: The higher is the cost of finance, the lower is the chosen
probability of an increase in manufacturing productivity. Not also that there
are scale effects in (A.13): The higher is manufacturing employment the greater
the chosen ϕ∗.
A.4. Solving for growth rates
Growth accelerates during the process of structural transformation because, in
the short-run, a shrinking agricultural sector drags down the aggregate growth
generated by the productivity growth. Over time, the size of the agriculture
sector approaches a subsistence level and growth is caused by productivity
growth in manufacturing alone.
Suppose that all manufacturing firms in a parish invest in research activity
each period, the growth rate of of ZM is,
gZM (f,L
M (t)) =
ZM (t+ 1)
ZM (t)
− 1 = ϕ∗(f,LM (t))∆ (A.14)
The impact of a higher gZM is a faster growth of L
M .
Total output is Y (t) = p(t)Y A(t) + YM (t), i.e.,
Y (t) = ZM
(
G′(LM (t))
F ′(1− LM (t))
F (1− LM (t)) +G(LM (t))
)
(A.15)
Output growth is the product of technological progress in manufacturing both
directly and via structural transformation. Suppose that time is continuous and
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we calculate growth rates based on a marginal change in ZM ,
Ẏ (t)
Y (t)
= gY (t) = gZM (f,L
M (t)) ·
[
1 + Φ(t)
∂LM (t)
∂ZM (t)
]
(A.16)
where Φ(t) < 0.33 The aggregate growth rate increases during the structural
transformation. In the short-run, a shrinking agricultural sector drags down
the aggregate growth generated by the productivity growth. Over time, this
stabilizes at a subsistence level: In the limit, labour in agriculture is only to
provide subsistence consumption,
lim
t→∞
LM (t) = L̄M = 1− F−1(γ/ZA). (A.17)
That is to say, limt→∞
∂LM (t)
∂ZM (t)
= 0. Moreover, as LM (t) approaches L̄M , so gY
approaches a long-run growth path gZM ,
lim
t→∞
gY = ϕ
∗(f, L̄M )∆ (A.18)
33
In particular,
Φ(t) =
ZM (t)F (1− LM (t))
[
F ′(1−LM (t))G′′(LM (t))+G′(LM (t))F ′′(1−LM (t))
(F ′(1−LM (t)))2
]
(
G′(LM (t))
F ′(1−LM (t))F (1− L
M (t)) +G(LM (t))
)
 < 0
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A.5. Finance, growth and structural transformation
We take the the inverse of the cost of obtaining finance, f , to be our simple
measure of access to financial services in a parish, that is, FIN = 1/f . The
less costly is access to a bank in a given parish, the greater is FIN and the
higher is the probability of innovation. As Levine (2005) discusses, there can
be a number of different channels by which banks affect growth. In particular,
a bank may: Facilitate better investment; provide pooling and diversification
services; and, ease exchange and improve contracting.
Access to banking varies by parish, so FINp is indexed on p. In addition
to access to banks, there are other determinants of changes in productivity
such as variations in resource endowments or access to markets. From (A.11),
the expected technology jump is, dZMp = ϕ
∗(FINp, L
M
p (t))∆ +Xp where Xp
is a vector of non-bank determinants of productivity growth. Using equation
(A.10), we can thus write the change in manufacturing labour as,
dLMp =
∂LMp
∂ZMp
· dZMp = h′(ZMp )
[
ϕ∗(FINp, L
M
p (t))∆p +Xp
]
(A.19)
Equation (A.19) contains the channel through which finance causes structural
transformation. The expression also highlights the problem we will face in
identifying a causal relationship from finance to growth: There is a connection
from LM to the optimal research intensity. Productivity improvements which
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induce structural transformation will also induce greater demand for financial
services.
Divide both sides of (A.19) by LM to obtain an expression for the growth
of industrial labour, and let γMp = lnEmplp,1881 − lnEmplp,1817. We can then
approximate34 the structural relationship between finance and manufacturing
employment growth as,
γMp = α+ β1FINp +X
′
pβ2 + µd + εp (A.20)
where the coefficient β1 is to be estimated.
Appendix B: Data
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are provided in Table
1. We use the occupational geography data described in Shaw-Taylor et al.
(2010) for the years 1817 and 1881. To provide a better understanding of the
importance of local access to financial services for subsequent industrial growth,
we benefit from high spatial resolution and detailed occupational classification
of our data. We observe the number of adult males employed in occupations
classified according to the PST (Primary-Secondary-Tertiary) system devised
34
That is, we assume that the non-linearities in equation (A.19) can be approximated by
taking FIN to be the natural log of employment in finance.
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by Wrigley (2010).35 The three Sectors (PST) are composed of 133 Groups
(such as agriculture, mining, textiles, financial services etc.) and these Groups
are composed of 539 Sections (such as coal mining, cotton textiles, and so on).
When we refer to primary sector employment below, we always mean primary
less mining.
The occupational data is observed at the level of the ancient parish. For
1817, Shaw-Taylor et al. (2010) map into 11,102 ancient parishes covering
England and Wales. Most of the parishes persist over the period, but some
are split and a few are merged; at 1881 there are 15,132 parishes. Both sets
of parishes are made up of an underlying GIS of historical parishes updated
from Kain and Oliver (2001). Using these, we form 10,738 consistent spatial
units to create a panel dataset of nineteenth century parish employment. After
dropping parishes with zero population in 1817 or 1881 and parishes in and
around London, this number reduces to 10,521 parishes. These parishes have
an average size of 14.1km2 (an average radius of just 2.1km) and employ on
average 230 adult males. Of these 10,521 consistent parishes, one third (3,463)
of the parishes connect different spatial units across the two periods and we
35
There is at present no source for 1817 female employment remotely comparable to that
used here for male employment. The 1851 census suggests that, after domestic services,
female employment is predominantly in manufacturing (of textiles and clothing), although
Higgs (1987) and Sharpe (1995) detail concerns about the enumeration of female occupations
in that 1851 census. Therefore, we control for the proportion of the population that is female.
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control for these particular units in all regressions. The parishes are nested
in 587 registration districts which themselves make up 59 counties. Note that
17 registration districts comprise only one parish. We drop these observations
since we use registration district fixed effects by default. This leaves us with
10,504 parishes within 570 registration districts and 54 counties.
The information for 1881 is based on occupational data in the census records
of that year. Prior to 1841, however, the UK census did not record occupations.
By an 1812 Act of Parliament,36 it was a requirement on those recording
baptisms in parishes to also record the occupation of the father. The data for
1817 thus result from a massive undertaking described in Kitson et al. (2012)
to create a ‘quasi-census’ from the occupational information in these baptism
records over the period 1813–20 (which we refer to as 1817). Whether such a
source is an accurate measure of adult employment rests on whether marital
fertility varied by geography and occupation. As Kitson et al. note, there is no
convincing evidence that fertility systematically varied by social group within a
community. Moreover, the direct evidence on occupational structure that does
exist for some small areas at this time is extremely close to the occupational
estimates derived from baptism registers. We thus take this data as a good,
unbiased measure of the 1817 occupational structure of adult males.
36
This is the Parochial Registers Act of 1812, often referred to as ‘Rose’s Act’.
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With this information, we can calculate employment growth in occupation
i and parish p as γMip = lnEmplip,1881− lnEmplip,1817. In a typical estimation,
we predict employment growth in occupation i and parish p between 1817
and 1881 as function of access to finance in 1817 conditional on initial parish
characteristics observed in 1817.
Our main variable of interest is access to finance in 1817. We measure access
to finance by the number of adult male employees working in ‘Financial services
and professions’ which is a subsector of the tertiary sector, per the Wrigley
(2010) classification. At the beginning of the period, 88% of the parishes do not
have access to banking services in their immediate environment and only half
the parishes have at least one employee working in finance within 5km.37 At a
time of poor transport connections, this distance is significant and, in practice,
means that a large fraction of parishes could not easily access professional
financial services. Over the next 64 years, this clearly changed and in 1881
we observe that one third of the parishes has immediate access to finance
and 86% of the parishes could access finance within 5km. Considering the
improvements in transportation over this time that led to a massive reduction
in the importance of distance we can conclude that all regions had equal access
to finance at the end of our observation period.
37
Since we use the log of finance employment in our empirical model, we calculate
lnFINp,1817 = ln(FINp,1817 + 1) to avoid missings.
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Appendix C: Post Town Characteristics
Consistent with the idea that these early post towns were strategic, not
economic, is their population size. We use the data in Bairoch (1988) to identify
those cities with a population of more than 1,000 inhabitants. Out of 55 such
cities in 1600, only 14 were an Elizabethan post town. Put differently, only
20% of the Elizabethan post towns had a population greater than 1,000 at
1600. An example of a large city that could have been connected but was not
is Birmingham.38
Moreover, we can consider the (truncated) size distribution of towns.
If the post towns are truly unrelated with population size, then their size
distribution should match the size distribution of all towns. Figure H.3 reports
the cumulative distribution of city size (excluding London) at four dates from
1500–1750, i.e., before country banks were widely established. As can be seen,
the size distribution of post towns closely follows that for all towns in the run-up
to the nineteenth century, matching both the size distribution within a period
and the shift of that distribution over time. The two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test fails to reject the Null at 5% significance level that the data
are drawn from the same distribution in each period.
38
By contrast, one may argue that the assumption of randomness may not apply to the
case of Bath since there is a clear deviation in the post road to meet it. However, dropping
Bath from the set of post towns does not affect our results.
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Finally, it may have been that the selection of a town to be a post town in the
16th Century caused it to grow faster over the subsequent period, putting it in
a position more favourable to industrial change. Using the Bairoch (1988) data,
we find no evidence that Elizabethan post towns experienced faster population
growth over the period 1600–1850.
Appendix D: Robustness Checks
This Section reports estimates from several alternative specifications designed
to probe the robustness of our main findings.
D.1. Geography and Effect Heterogeneity
This Section discusses the robustness tests that are summarized in Section
5.3 in more detail. We start with a number of specifications where we test
the robustness of our results to the sample specification. We first ask whether
the observed finance effect is driven by the faster manufacturing growth in
the North. For this purpose, we split England and Wales along the 53◦ North
latitude and run the estimation without the manufacturing-intensive north. As
can be seen in column 1 of Table G.4, doing so leads to a highly significant
coefficient that is somewhat larger than that obtained using the whole sample.
This makes intuitive sense since the South was in a position of having to catch-
up relative to the more heavily industrialized North.
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Next, we assess whether the exclusion of the London parishes changes our
results. As we can see in column 2, including the parishes around London has
virtually no effect on the estimated finance coefficient. In column 3, we run
a specification for parishes that were located within a 10 km corridor of the
Elizabethan post roads. Column 4 considers a subset of parishes that had access
to a turnpike roads in 1817. By restricting our sample to parishes with road
access, we can test whether finance has an effect on manufacturing growth that
is independent of road-specific factors. Reassuringly, the effect of finance access
is smaller but remains significant. In column 5 we drop all post towns below
the 25th or above the 75th percentile in the distance distribution in Figure 3.
Doing so narrows the range of distance to the interval 19.24-26.85 km. Reducing
the number of post towns from 69 to 42 does not affect our results suggesting
that the observed relationship is not driven by post towns at the tails of the
distribution where the random allocation argument may not hold. Finally, in
column 6 we drop all Welsh parishes where we lack enclosure information and
again do not see a substantial change in our basic findings.
Finally, it may be the case that certain soil characteristics simultaneously
affect productivity in agriculture and manufacturing. To account for that,
we include a set of indicators for soil characteristics from the UK National
Soil Resources Institute (NSRI).39 The NSRI ‘soilscapes’ classification of land
is based on a variety of location characteristics that are aggregated into
39
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27 soilscapes available for 1km x 1km cells covering England and Wales.
Controlling for these functional types, we see in column 7 of Table G.4 no
indication that the omission of these variables would have biased our results.
D.2. Additional Economic Effects
The next block of tests in Table G.5 considers additional controls that reflect
heterogeneity in the geography of interactions between economic agents within-
registration districts which may lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction.
Relevant markets are not necessarily confined to political borders. We thus
control for the log of employment size within a distance of 15 km.40 Next,
we extend our definition of market potential and calculate for each parish p
a measure marketaccess =
∑
j∈J
popj
distpj
that captures the distance weighted
population where J is the set of all 305 post towns that existed in 1791 or all
579 market towns that existed in 1722. None of these market potential controls
changes our baseline results.
Next, we controls address the concern that post towns might be the
home to more wealthy individuals who could have been bankers as well as
industrialists. We proxy wealth by the share of employment in domestic services
The data come as raster data file with 1km x 1km cells. To aggregate this information
to the parish level, we calculate zonal statistics and choose the dominant characteristic. If
there are missing, we interpolate with values from neighboring cells.
40
Using 5 or 10km instead does not change the results.
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as a proxy. Wealthy parishes may also have a more educated population which
benefits economic growth (see Becker and Woessmann, 2009). In the absence
of information on individual education, we control for the number of teachers
in a parish. Additionally, we consider the number of patents in a parish and
its first neighbors since we may be concerned that initial wealth triggered
innovative activities or that roads may have facilitated information flows that
benefit manufacturing through knowledge production. We see that including
these controls does not affect our baseline results much.41
In a final robustness check, we account for the fact that, while 1817 was
prior to the takeoff in per capita growth, there were significant industrial
developments before this date. As a result, the initial industry structure may be
a good predictor of future growth and correlate with finance access. To account
for that, we include a Bartik shift-share control for predicted manufacturing
employment based upon employment shares in manufacturing subsectors in
parish p in 1817.42 Including this control should capture all growth effects
from potentially confounding initial conditions. Unsurprisingly, controlling for
the predicted growth path decreases the finance effect but it remains relevant
and significant. At the same time, the coefficient on our predicted employment
control is negative suggesting that the industry composition in 1817 is not
41
For more details on the patent data we refer to the reader to Nuvolari and Tartari (2011)
42
predictedgrowth =
∑
m∈M
emplpm
emplm
∆emplj,1817−1881 for all M industries in parish p.
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a good predictor of future growth. This corroborates our argument that the
geography of production changed over this period and it also shows that
banking access was a relevant driver of this process.
D.3. Standard Errors
In this last subsection, we explore whether clustering our standard errors
on the level of registrations districts is enough to absorb potential spatial
autocorrelation. Registration districts are the local government level above
parishes. Given the costs of distance, it seems most likely that common shocks
occur at this level of aggregation. We now consider an alternative specifications
where we cluster standard errors on the level of 59 counties to absorb common
institutional shocks on a more aggregate level. One remaining concern is
that restricting serial correlation to be within arbitrary jurisdictions may not
account for technology shocks that may spread over larger spatial units without
stopping at administrative boarders. To detach our cluster strategy from
administrative boundaries, we follow the Bleakley and Lin (2012) application
of a method by Bester et al. (2011) and cluster on the level of 100× 100km
or alternatively 50 × 50km grid squares that enclose all parishes. In Table
G.6, we show the results for our two instruments separately and for the joint
specification. It is reassuring to see that the standard errors are robust to these
alternative strategies, suggesting that serial correlation across space does not
affect our findings.
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Appendix E: Alternative Instrument
In Section 5.3 of the main text we briefly described an alternative instrument,
enclosures of land before the mid-seventeenth century. We present here a more
detailed motivation along with the results of the basic regressions with this
instrument.
E.1. Early Enclosures as Instrument
Prior to the enclosure movement, traditional, low-scale agricultural production
took place within a parish on common land with common rights to its use. An
enclosure involved the mapping and physical containment of land for the private
use of a landowner. In practice, this was an encroachment of the landowner or
his farmer on the land used by the local populace. The peasant proprietor
was converted into a wage-earning labourer. The economic motivation for the
landowner can have been simply to attain scale or to implement productivity-
enhancing technologies such as fertilisers.
We consider two phases of enclosure in England and Wales. The first
occurred during the Tudor and Stuart eras from the late 15th century to the
end of the English Civil War (1642-51). During this period a vast amount
of agricultural land was transferred from the old feudal-military aristocracy,
the Church and the Crown, into the hands of non-noble landholders. These
included merchants, professional men, state office-holders and the knight-class
who had acquired large landholding, often by buying manors or estates from
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impoverished members of the traditional feudal aristocracy. With this change
in landownership came a change from a feudal mindset to a more capitalist
approach with a consequent change in the structure of agricultural production.
Instead of looking at land as a means of supporting political and military power
these new agricultural capitalists – often of urban professional or mercantile
origin – sought to exploit the land for its market potential. As grain prices
rose into the seventeenth century, so the incentives to control and expand
landholdings grew.
Besides large-scale landowners, Allen (1992) documents the role played by
a class of small-scale farmers, the yeomen, that emerged during the first wave
of enclosures. An important distinction to be made is that early enclosures,
which increased the scale of production in some areas, did not in practice
generate productivity advantages over the yeomen farmers. Allen (1992)
carefully documents that the relationship between enclosures and land yields is
small, while many open field yeoman consistently adopted new technologies. In
other words, while the early enclosure movement did increase farm scale, the
connection, via productivity, to the release of labour for manufacturing was
limited.
The pre-1650 enclosures thus created resilient, large-scale agricultural
concerns that established areas of demand for agricultural banking services
into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. An additional channel stressed
by Allen (1992) is that large landowners would also present better customers
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to banks because their estates could serve as collateral. With the growth of the
mortgage market through the seventeenth century, emerging country banks
were influenced in their location decisions by the presence of large-scale farms
(Pressnell, 1956).
After 1650, the nature of the agricultural improvements associated with
enclosures began to change, with a second wave of enclosures beginning in the
eighteenth century. This second phase of enclosures meant the death of yeoman
farming (Allen, 1992) and significant changes in agricultural productivity. Allen
(2004) reports agricultural output per worker is roughly stable over the period
1300 to 1600, but nearly doubles from 1600 to 1800. The break in the nature of
enclosures was partly political: Following the end of the Civil War, the tension
between landowners and the Crown was, to some extent, resolved in favour of
the landowners. Where previously the Crown could insulate the peasantry from
excessive exploitation by landowners, the State thereafter interfered less with
the economic activities of the increasingly influential landed elite (Moore, 1966;
Allen, 1992; and, in a different context, Jha, forthcoming). This broke resistance
to a wider enclosure movement. Around the same time, a number of new
technologies (such as fertilisers, new grasses and crops) increased the incentives
for all types of enclosures at different scales and with different agricultural
outputs. As Tate (1967, p79) describes it, “The agricultural revolution ... now
goes forward in great waves.” These later (typically Parliamentary) enclosures
were more related with intensive growth and were more closely associated with
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the processes of the Industrial Revolution (the release of labour into cities)
or were even a response to it (such as the mechanization of agriculture).
Given their closer connection to the rise of industry, the later enclosures may
imply direct effects. As a result, we do not consider these later enclosures as
instruments but focus solely on the early enclosures.
Our information on early enclosures stems from the data in Clark and
Clark (2001)43 which reports the common rights status of farm land owned by
charities in England between 1500 and 1839. The dataset contains information
from 18,962 maps extracted from over 40,000 pages of descriptions of charity
land generated by various enquiries into charitable asset holdings from 1786
to 1912. To match the information with our data, we determine each of the
1851 parish centroids and merge them into our parish units. We then use the
information on the fraction of land with common rights to determine locations
that were fully enclosed by 1650 and use them to explain the location of country
banks and finance employment. This leaves us with 414 parishes with an early
enclosure as depicted in Figure 2. Out of those parishes, 139 (34%) hosted
a bank or some finance employment. Since the enclosure information is only
available for England and not Wales, this instrument is limited to 9,664 English
parishes (excluding the London area).
43
See ‘The Enclosure History Data Set’ available here: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/
faculty/gclark/data.html.
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To the extent that pre-1650 enclosures do not affect industrial firms’
location choice, we can use early enclosure events as an instrument to predict
the location of country banks founded before the industrial take-off could
possibly be expected. We consider a number of potential concerns with this
instrument. First, there may be a direct or indirect relationship between
enclosures uprooting farm workers and the availability of a large pool of cheap,
unskilled labor looking for jobs in the industrial sector (cf. Williamson, 2002).
A direct relationship could be via the loss of rights to common land that
yeoman farmers relied upon. However, Shaw-Taylor (2012) shows that, for the
Parliamentary enclosure movement, labourers did not generally have common
rights to lose. An indirect channel could be via agricultural productivity
improvements that release labour but, as noted above, there is no evidence
that early enclosures generated higher productivity than open farms of the
period.44 That is, enclosures were not offsetting labour, directly or indirectly,
by the time of our observational period in 1817. Therefore, we should capture
any potentially biasing effects with our controls at the beginning of the period
controls.
44
There is also evidence from relative prices that, at least on aggregate, the dominant cause
of structural transformation over this period was productivity growth in industry (Yang
and Zhu, 2013). This would imply a pull into the industrial sector because of productivity
growth raising industrial wages, rather than a push out of primary occupations.
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A second concern is that the agrarian sector was supplying working capital
for the industrial sector. Farmers deposited their idle funds in local county
banks who then made loans via the London banks to banks in industrial
towns who supplied credit to industrial firms. This circulation of capital via
London meant that a geographical connection from a local farm to a local
manufacturer was no more feasible than between a farm and manufacturer
at different ends of the country (Black, 1989). We look to account for this
concern by running separate regressions for the North and South. Thirdly,
agricultural productivity may be linked to a greater density of economic
activity and generally a higher population density. If this implies agglomeration
economies that benefited industrial firms our instruments will not meet the
exclusion restriction. To overcome these concerns, we condition the instrument
on the initial employment share in agriculture and a Herfindahl index of
industry concentration. We additionally include controls for the transportation
infrastructure because better accessibility may have affected the agricultural
viability of land and manufacturing. One last concern is that those individuals
who enclosed land and commercialized agriculture have specific entrepreneurial
abilities and wealth that they now redirect towards industrial projects. Ventura
and Voth (2015) present a counter-argument to this concern, but we anyway
control for a proxy of the level of wealth in each parish.
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E.2. Results with Enclosure Instrument
Table G.2 presents results from regressions where we instrument access to
finance with early enclosures. The Table follows the structure of Table 3.
Columns 1-6 develop our preferred IV model with all controls stepwise, Column
7 estimates the effect without post town locations, Column 8 drops Wales
since we do not have enclosure data for Wales and Column 9 provides the
OLS specification as baseline. All specifications show F -statistics of excluded
instruments between 17 and 21 and Anderson-Rubin p-values that are below
0.01 suggesting that our second instrument is also strong. In the second stage,
our estimations suggest a statistically significant and positive effect of finance
on industrial growth across all specifications. Our preferred specification in
column 6 suggests that 10% more finance employment in 1817 leads to 9.23%
more industrial employment 64 years later. Importantly, this effect is quite
similar to the coefficients of 1.266 reported in our estimations with the post
town instrument (which is why we comfortably fail to reject the over-identifying
restriction in the specifications where we use both instruments.
To assess the robustness of the enclosure instrument, we perform present
the results of balancing tests on (i) pre-existing characteristics that might
have driven the choice to enclose and (ii) balancing tests on the 1817 controls
included in the IV specifications. In contrast to the post town locations, we
find some significant differences in the pre-existing characteristics. They are
further away form the coast, are flatter and show slightly better conditions
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to grow rye and wheat. While we cannot rule out some selectivity in early
enclosure status, an omnibus test conditional on our base controls (registration
fixed effects, parish size and territorial changes) works against the concern that
these non-balancing controls might drive the estimated effect.
Next, we assess the balance of the start-of-the-period controls in 1817. We
observe that enclosures are a bit larger than the average, host slightly less
agricultural and mining employment and look a bit more concentrated. Again,
an omnibus test where we condition the enclosure instrument on fixed effects,
parish size and territorial changes suggests that the variation that is explained
by the control variables is of second order importance in the estimation of the
enclosure effect.
In a final check, we assess the sensitivity of our estimates to a violation of the
exclusion restriction. This time, we allow the vector γencl from a hypothetical
regression of manufacturing growth on finance access, our enclosure instrument
and the full set of control variables to differ slightly from zero, i.e. γencl ∈
[−δ, δ]. By relaxing the restriction γencl = 0 we allow for small direct effects
of our instrumental variable on manufacturing growth and parameterize it.
Specifically, we consider the following two scenarios. First, a case where we
do not have prior beliefs about the direction of the bias and, second, a case
where we impose a direction of the bias. In the most conservative case, we
define minimum and maximum allowable violations of the exclusion restriction
(Case 1). Alternatively, we assume for the instrument that γencl is uniformly
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distributed on the interval [−δ, δ] (Case 2) in the symmetric case or [−δ, 0]
(Case 3) in the asymmetric case where we assume a negative bias.
Figure 4 shows the results of this robustness test where we assess both
instruments jointly. Panel A reports results with no prior information about
the bias. The dotted line represents Case 1 and the dashed line Case 2.
Panel B imposes prior information that the instrument is upward biased (Case
3a) and Panel C imposes an alternative scenario where enclosures induce a
negative bias (Case 3b). For the case of enclosures, we do not have a clear
prior about the direction of a potential bias. Enclosures could have a positive
direct effect if one believed that successful agriculturalists would also make
good manufacturing entrepreneurs while we would expect a negative effect if
successful agriculturalists would be systematically less inclined to switch to
manufacturing. We can see that the test is a bit more sensitive to a violation of
the exclusion restriction. In this case, it most conservative specification would
require a direct effect of 0.4 or above to accept the null hypothesis that banking
access does not affect manufacturing growth and thus invalidate our finding.
In the less restrictive cases, the threshold goes up to 0.8. Given this higher
sensitivity, we cautiously interpret these results as additional support for the
validity of our enclosure instrument and continue with results where we use
both instruments jointly.
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E.3. Results with Both Instruments
Table G.3 presents our baseline results from regressions where we instrument
access to finance with both the Elizabethan post town instrument and the
enclosure dummy. Again, the Table follows the structure of Table 3. Columns
1-7 show IV estimates and Column 8 shows OLS results of our growth regression
including the full set of control variables from our preferred specification.
We develop our preferred specification in Columns 1-6 and we drop Wales
in Column 7 since we do not have enclosure data for this region. In all
specifications, F -statistics of excluded instruments range between 13-17 and
all Anderson-Rubin p-values are close to zero. Comparing Tables 3, G.2 and
G.3, it is reassuring that we find quite similar coefficients even though our
instruments employ different ranges of variation.
Appendix F: Spatial Spillovers
We define neighbors in the following way. A first-order neighbor of parish p
shares a co-ordinate in the GIS polygon; a second-order neighbour of p shares
a co-ordinate with the first-order neighbour of p, but not with p itself. Let N1p
and N2p be the set of parish p’s 1
st- and 2nd-order neighbors, respectively. For
each p, we sum the number of finance employees or banks, in the two sets of
neighbors. Let FIN1p,1817 =
∑
p′∈N1p
FINp′ for the first order neighbors and
FIN2p,1817 =
∑
p′∈N2p
FINp′ for the second order neighbors. FIN
0
p,1817 would
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be the measure of finance in parish p. Following the same logic, we extend our
instrument and define a post town instrument z11,p = 1 if at least one first-
order neighbor is an Elizabethan post town location and z21,p = 1 if at least one
second-order neighbor is an Elizabethan post town location.
Using this additional information, we augment our regression equations (2)
and (3) in the following way:
γMp = β0 +X
′
p,1817β1 +
2∑
n=0
γnF̂ IN
n
p,1817 + µd + εp (F.1)
FIN0p,1817 = α00 + α01z
0
p +X
′
p,1817α
2
02 + µd + ν0p (F.2)
FIN1p,1817 = α10 + α11z
1
p +X
′
p,1817α
2
12 + µd + ν1p (F.3)
FIN2p,1817 = α20 + α21z
2
p +X
′
p,1817α
2
22 + µd + ν2p (F.4)
where we regress manufacturing employment growth in parish p on our
measures of finance access in the parish itself (FIN0p,1817), the first-order
neighboring parishes (FIN1p,1817), and the second-order neighboring parishes
(FIN2p,1817), the full set of initial control variables Xp,1817 (used in Table G.3,
Column 6), and additional controls for the number of neighbors in the first and
second ring of neighbors and a coastal dummy. Controlling for the number of
neighbors accounts for the fact that more neighbors increase the possibility
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to have at least one neighbor with finance access and the coastal dummy
accounts for the fact that coastal parishes are surrounded by less neighbors. We
further include registration district fixed effects (µd) which provide that we are
comparing parishes with different degrees of finance access nearby in the same
registration district. Importantly, neighbors are not restricted to be within the
registration district and capture parishes in neighbouring registration districts
as well. We are interested in the coefficients γn which indicate the impact
of finance access on manufacturing growth at each band of neighbors. To
account for the endogeneity of finance, we employ the Elizabethan post town
instruments z01,p − z21,p in the first stage.
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Appendix G: Additional Tables
Table G.1. Balance of Pre-Existing Exogenous Differences for Early Enclosures
Coefficient SE
1 Domesday village within 5km (dummy) -0.012 (0.013)
2 Log distance to nearest 1670 waterway 0.053 (0.060)
3 Log distance to nearest sea port -0.010 (0.007)
4 Distance to the coast -0.170** (0.072)
5 Avg. Slope (in percent) -0.043* (0.022)
6 Coal access (dummy) 0.015 (0.011)
7 Yield oats (in t/ha) 0.003 (0.002)
8 Yield rye (in t/ha) 0.005 (0.004)
9 Yield wheat (in t/ha) 0.006* (0.003)
10 Yield barley (in t/ha) 0.006* (0.003)
11 Soil Categorie -0.026 (0.018)
Notes: Each row shows the result of a separate regression of the outcome named in the left
column on the Enclosure Instrument. All regressions are conditional on registration district fixed
effects, an indicator for territorial changes and a control for the differences in the size of parishes.
Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. *** significant at the 1 percent
level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
H
eb
lich
&
T
rew
B
a
n
k
in
g
a
n
d
In
d
u
stria
liza
tio
n
1
0
1
Table G.2. Results with Enclosure Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Log finance employment c.1817
1.728*** 1.061*** 1.037*** 0.925*** 0.922*** 0.923*** 0.875*** 0.913*** 0.206***
(0.498) (0.321) (0.323) (0.324) (0.324) (0.324) (0.315) (0.325) (0.023)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.318*** -0.213*** -0.300*** -0.595*** -0.572*** -0.572*** -0.585*** -0.557*** -0.598***
(0.086) (0.045) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Log area (in km2)
0.219*** 0.209*** 0.270*** 0.246*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.226*** 0.214***
(0.055) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024)
Share primary employment c.1817
-0.922*** -1.540*** -1.416*** -1.415*** -1.366*** -1.284*** -1.918***
(0.233) (0.301) (0.304) (0.304) (0.288) (0.313) (0.204)
Share mining employment c.1817
0.802*** 0.061 0.169 0.171 0.169 0.021 -0.193
(0.251) (0.289) (0.295) (0.295) (0.286) (0.291) (0.228)
Coal access
0.110* 0.107* 0.108* 0.109* 0.106* 0.030 0.124**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.048) (0.060)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.120 0.269 0.267 0.266 0.197 0.243 0.463***
(0.174) (0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.197) (0.198) (0.177)
Log employment c.1817
0.367*** 0.343*** 0.343*** 0.371*** 0.355*** 0.466***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.070) (0.047)
Female population share c.1817
-0.108 -0.112 -0.113 -0.069 -0.224 -0.100
(0.193) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.204) (0.181)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.018 0.018 0.019 0.023 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.003 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.003
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.656** 0.655** 0.673** 0.735** 0.673***
(0.266) (0.266) (0.266) (0.303) (0.260)
Latitude
-0.010 0.010 -0.178 0.036
(0.237) (0.235) (0.222) (0.234)
Longitude
0.063 0.046 0.010 0.058
(0.141) (0.139) (0.143) (0.138)
First Stage:
Enclosure before 1650 (Dummy)
0.135*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.137***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,432 9,523 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 566 523 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0013 0.0010
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 16.99 21.86 21.36 19.77 19.74 19.75 20.12 19.50
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measured as log employment in finance. Columns (1)-(7) present instrumental variable regressions and Column (8) presents the OLS regression. The
instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish i was fully enclosed by 1650. Column (1) is the most parsimonious specification
without registration fixed effects that only controls for the initial 1817 manufacturing share and size as well as territorial changes in the parish between
c.1817 and 1881. Columns (2)-(5) are conditional on registration district fixed effects and additional sets of control variables are gradually included. Column
(6) presents our preferred outcome. Column (7) excludes post town locations and Column (8) excludes Wales since we do not have enclosure data for this
region. Finally, Column (9) displays the results of an OLS estimation of our preferred specification in Column (6) for comparison. Standard errors are
clustered on the registration district level in all specifications. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant
at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.3. Results with Both Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Log finance employment c.1817
1.400*** 1.250*** 1.171*** 1.099*** 1.096*** 1.097*** 1.048*** 0.206***
(0.335) (0.288) (0.281) (0.297) (0.298) (0.298) (0.320) (0.023)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.263*** -0.239*** -0.314*** -0.589*** -0.566*** -0.566*** -0.552*** -0.598***
(0.060) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
Log area (in km2)
0.190*** 0.221*** 0.275*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.232*** 0.214***
(0.042) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024)
Share primary employment c.1817
-0.864*** -1.417*** -1.294*** -1.293*** -1.189*** -1.918***
(0.214) (0.272) (0.277) (0.277) (0.286) (0.204)
Share mining employment c.1817
0.825*** 0.150 0.257 0.260 0.088 -0.193
(0.255) (0.289) (0.295) (0.295) (0.293) (0.228)
Coal access
0.107* 0.104* 0.105* 0.105* 0.025 0.124**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.048) (0.060)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.091 0.221 0.220 0.218 0.206 0.463***
(0.168) (0.187) (0.187) (0.187) (0.182) (0.177)
Log employment c.1817
0.337*** 0.313*** 0.313*** 0.331*** 0.466***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078) (0.047)
Female population share c.1817
-0.110 -0.115 -0.116 -0.227 -0.100
(0.199) (0.199) (0.199) (0.209) (0.181)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.019 0.019 0.024 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.003 0.003 0.010 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.652** 0.650** 0.722** 0.673***
(0.273) (0.273) (0.311) (0.260)
Latitude
-0.022 -0.186 0.036
(0.235) (0.223) (0.234)
Longitude
0.064 0.012 0.058
(0.142) (0.145) (0.138)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.375*** 0.352*** 0.329*** 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.271***
(0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.101)
Enclosure before 1650 (Dummy)
0.133*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 9,523 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 523 570 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 15.24 16.95 15.90 14.95 14.91 14.91 13.06
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measured as log employment in finance. Columns (1)-(7) present instrumental variable regressions and Column (8) presents the OLS regression. The
instrumental variable is either a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish i is an Elizabethan post town or a dummy variable that takes the value 1
if parish i was fully enclosed by 1650. Column (1) is the most parsimonious specification without registration fixed effects that only controls for the initial
1817 manufacturing share and size as well as territorial changes in the parish between c.1817 and 1881. Columns (2)-(5) are conditional on registration
district fixed effects and additional sets of control variables are gradually included. Column (6) presents our preferred outcome. Column (7) excludes Wales
since we do not have enclosure data for this region. Finally, Column (8) displays the results of an OLS estimation of our preferred specification in Column
(6) for comparison. Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level in all specifications. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant
at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.4. First Nature Geography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Without With 10km around Only Dist. Post Town Soil Yield
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment North London Post Road Road-Parishes p25-p75 Suitability Land Cover
Log finance employment c.1817
1.480** 1.281** 1.434** 0.882** 1.148** 1.267** 1.327**
(0.634) (0.514) (0.577) (0.431) (0.475) (0.518) (0.531)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.563*** -0.559*** -0.481*** -0.590*** -0.564*** -0.562*** -0.562***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.069) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Log area (in km2)
0.301*** 0.274*** 0.319*** 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.274*** 0.287***
(0.047) (0.038) (0.061) (0.033) (0.036) (0.039) (0.041)
Share primary employment c.1817
-1.051*** -1.373*** -0.952** -1.423*** -1.257*** -1.187*** -1.176***
(0.387) (0.372) (0.481) (0.374) (0.360) (0.400) (0.408)
Share mining employment c.1817
0.460 0.281 1.055** 0.087 0.286 0.358 0.361
(0.395) (0.363) (0.529) (0.369) (0.348) (0.377) (0.392)
Coal access
0.126 0.109* 0.200 0.116* 0.104* 0.104* 0.120**
(0.082) (0.059) (0.134) (0.063) (0.060) (0.059) (0.057)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.186 0.323 0.201 0.241 0.204 0.178 0.190
(0.206) (0.212) (0.342) (0.236) (0.200) (0.212) (0.215)
Log employment c.1817
0.297** 0.252** 0.155 0.383*** 0.304*** 0.278*** 0.266**
(0.115) (0.112) (0.131) (0.095) (0.100) (0.106) (0.108)
Female population share c.1817
-0.030 -0.082 -0.559 -0.156 -0.116 -0.084 -0.091
(0.235) (0.208) (0.449) (0.251) (0.200) (0.205) (0.206)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.035* 0.017 -0.001 0.019 0.018 0.018
(0.020) (0.017) (0.036) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.005 -0.001 -0.048 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.007
(0.025) (0.022) (0.048) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.490 0.496* 0.778 0.986*** 0.649** 0.632** 0.596**
(0.303) (0.286) (0.474) (0.308) (0.275) (0.281) (0.287)
Latitude
-0.146 -0.035 1.284** -0.202 -0.025 -0.026 -0.007
(0.281) (0.235) (0.628) (0.275) (0.236) (0.225) (0.226)
Longitude
0.169 0.061 0.173 0.160 0.064 0.059 0.077
(0.158) (0.144) (0.338) (0.169) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.369*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.381*** 0.476*** 0.328*** 0.325***
(0.112) (0.097) (0.101) (0.141) (0.134) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 8,341 10,644 2,689 6,839 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 427 588 230 556 570 570 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0039 0.0028 0.0019 0.0154 0.0050 0.0026 0.0019
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 10.92 11.04 10.04 7.288 12.70 11.37 11.21
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measured as log employment in finance. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town.
All estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 but restrict the sample (Columns (1)-(5)) or add an
additional control variable that is specified in the column title of Columns (6) and (7). Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level in all
specifications. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.5. Second Nature Geography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Employment Distance Market Access Market Access Predicted
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment within 15km Port Post Town Market Town Wealth Teachers Innovation Employment
Log finance employment c.1817
1.289** 1.255** 1.263** 1.287** 1.255** 1.197** 1.381** 1.122**
(0.518) (0.507) (0.520) (0.540) (0.520) (0.477) (0.617) (0.520)
Log number secondary employment c.1817
-0.561*** -0.561*** -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.614*** -0.565*** -0.557*** -0.478***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.046) (0.038) (0.041) (0.034)
Log area (in km2)
0.269*** 0.258*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.270*** 0.258*** 0.272*** 0.244***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.043) (0.041)
Share primary employment c.1817
-1.159*** -1.174*** -1.174*** -1.167*** -1.360*** -1.157*** -1.163*** -0.987***
(0.399) (0.388) (0.397) (0.405) (0.417) (0.389) (0.415) (0.328)
Share mining employment c.1817
0.339 0.314 0.348 0.345 0.146 0.347 0.344 0.380
(0.374) (0.371) (0.369) (0.371) (0.389) (0.359) (0.378) (0.345)
Coal access
0.089 0.089 0.102* 0.099* 0.100* 0.103* 0.101* 0.095
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058)
Herfindahl Index c.1817
0.164 0.173 0.172 0.167 0.091 0.161 0.176 -0.009
(0.213) (0.210) (0.212) (0.216) (0.211) (0.214) (0.215) (0.177)
Log employment c.1817
0.279*** 0.285*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.328*** 0.305*** 0.276** 0.262***
(0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.107) (0.112) (0.096) (0.113) (0.090)
Female population share c.1817
-0.118 -0.110 -0.119 -0.112 -0.120 -0.134 -0.100 -0.082
(0.206) (0.203) (0.205) (0.206) (0.205) (0.203) (0.210) (0.200)
Road access c.1817 (dummy)
0.021 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.022
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Waterway access c.1817 (dummy)
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.005
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Share good transportation c.1817
0.686** 0.649** 0.652** 0.626** 0.420 0.677** 0.629** 0.596**
(0.283) (0.274) (0.281) (0.283) (0.296) (0.276) (0.288) (0.274)
Latitude
-0.008 -0.124 -0.041 -0.006 -0.034 -0.026 -0.024 -0.010
(0.234) (0.224) (0.235) (0.234) (0.235) (0.234) (0.236) (0.234)
Longitude
0.057 0.061 0.061 0.071 0.062 0.063 0.073 0.059
(0.144) (0.141) (0.145) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.145) (0.141)
Additional Controls as specified by Column
0.099* -0.332*** 0.072 -0.211 -1.064*** 2.503** -0.333 -0.089***
(0.052) (0.119) (0.185) (0.257) (0.274) (1.007) (0.270) (0.031)
First Stage:
Posttown Dummy
0.326*** 0.329*** 0.323*** 0.313*** 0.324*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.296***
(0.097) (0.098) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.094) (0.097)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Registration District FE 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570
Control for Territorial Changes Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Anderson-Rubin F-test (p-value) 0.0024 0.0030 0.0034 0.0037 0.0038 0.0022 0.0061 0.0083
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 11.26 11.31 11.11 10.59 11.16 11.20 8.885 9.294
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measures as log employment in finance. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town. All
estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 plus an additional control variable that is specified in the
column title. Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. *** significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and
* significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.6. Alternative clustering of the standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: ∆ log secondary employment Baseline County 100km 50km
Log finance employment c.1817
1.266** 1.266** 1.266** 1.266**
(0.517) (0.631) (0.546) (0.510)
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Control Variables Y Y Y Y
Number of Clusters 570 54 29 94
Notes: The Table presents results from IV-regressions of the log change in secondary employment between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance
measures as log employment in finance. Each Column presents a different way of clustering standard errors. Column (1) sets the baseline where standard
errors are clustered on the registration district level. In the following columns, we then cluster on the level of counties, 100x100km arbitrary grid cells, and
50x50km arbitrary grid cells. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p is an Elizabethan post town. All estimations
are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. ***
significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.7. Neighbor effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A: ∆ log secondary employment Panel B: ∆ Share Primary Sector
Log finance access c.1817
0.217*** 1.459*** -0.024*** -0.179**
(0.023) (0.566) (0.004) (0.071)
Log finance access c.1817, 1st neighbor
0.125*** 0.216* -0.017*** -0.043**
(0.016) (0.117) (0.003) (0.021)
Log finance access c.1817, 2nd neighbor
0.031** 0.048 -0.004* -0.019
(0.013) (0.091) (0.002) (0.017)
Panel C: ∆ Share Secondary Sector Panel D: ∆ Log Employment Density
Log finance access c.1817
0.021*** 0.232** 0.216*** 1.177**
(0.003) (0.095) (0.019) (0.468)
Log finance access c.1817, 1st neighbor
0.008*** 0.035** 0.106*** 0.140*
(0.002) (0.017) (0.012) (0.084)
Log finance access c.1817, 2nd neighbor
0.001 0.010 0.028*** 0.048
Neighbor and Coast Controls N Y N Y
Observations 10,504 10,504 10,504 10,504
Number of Clusters 570 570 570 570
Notes: The Table presents results from regressions of finance access measured as log employment in finance on the log change in secondary employment
(Panel A), the change in the share of primary sector employment (Panel B), the change in the share of secondary sector employment (Panel C) and the
change in the log of employment density (Panel D) between c.1817 and 1881 in parish p on access to finance. Columns (1) and (3) report OLS regressions
and Columns (2) and (4) report IV regressions. The instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if parish p (or its first or second
neighbor) is an Elizabethan post town. All estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3 Column 6 plus a control for
the number of neighbors and whether the parish is located at the coast. Standard errors are clustered on the registration district level. *** significant at
the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level and * significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G.8. Sector Mapping from Horrell et al. (1994) to PST
HHW industry Capital Good TFP PST
intensity type categories
Food, drink and tobacco Low Final High Food industries. Drink industries. Tobacco industries
Metal manufacture High Intermediate Low Iron and steel manufacture and products. Non-ferrous
metal manufacture and products
Textiles, clothing and leather goods Low Final Low Textiles. Clothing. Footwear. Industries using leather,
bone etc.
Metal goods High Intermediate Low Instrument making. Metal working. Machines and
tools, making and operation.
Bricks, pottery and glass Low Intermediate High Brick and tile manufacture.
Other manufacturing High Final High Furnishing. Minor manufactures and trades
Construction Low Final Low Building and construction.
Gas and water High Intermediate High Gas equipment. Fuel industries.
Transport High Final Low Road transport vehicles. Boat and ship building. Rail
transport vehicles.
Notes: This Table reports the Horrell et al. (1994, HHW) industries along with their characteristics reported in HHW: capital intensity (higher or lower
than median); good type (final or intermediate); TFP (higher or lower than national average). The PST categories are the Sector-Group level employment
categories that we relate to the HHW industries for use in Table 11.
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Appendix H: Additional Figures
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Figure H.1. Distance decay around Post Roads in Access to Finance
(a) Distance Decay (unconditional) (b) Distance Decay (conditional)
Notes: The Figure shows the coefficients of distance decay regressions where we regress the
log of the number of country bankers on distance bins that indicate the distance from the
nearest post road. 95% confidence intervals enclose the coefficients.
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Figure H.2. Plausibly Exogenous
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Panel C: 95% CI with Negative Prior
Notes: The Figure shows point estimates and 95%-confidence intervals for the effect of
1817 banking access on manufacturing growth over the period 1817-1881. In Panel A,
dotted lines refer to the most conservative specification that only imposed minimum and
maximum allowable violations of the exclusion restriction. The dashed line assumes the
same minimum and maximum allowable violations are uniformly distributed on the interval
[−δ, δ]. Panel B imposes the assumption that the enclosure instrument has a direct positive
effect on manufacturing growth, i.e. γ ∈ U(0, δ). Panel C imposes the assumption that the
enclosure instrument has a direct negative effect on manufacturing growth, i.e. γ ∈ U(0, δ).
All estimations are conditional on the controls in our preferred specification in Table 3
Column 6 and standard errors are clustered on the registration district level.
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Figure H.3. Cumulative distribution of city sizes: All vs. Elizabethan PTs
Notes: The Figure shows the cumulative distribution of city size (excluding London) at four
dates before country banks were widely established. We rely on Bairoch (1988) to identify
cities in England and Wales with a population of more than 1,000 inhabitants. In 1600, only
14 out of 55 listed cities were an Elizabethan post town. The size distributions of post towns
closely follows that for all towns in the run-up to the nineteenth century and the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the Null at 5% significance level that the data are
drawn from the same distribution in each period.
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